The American Society of Mechanical Engineers releases recommendations for a new nuclear safety construct. The following is taken from the official news release for the special task force report.
An ASME Task Force today
released recommendations for a new nuclear safety construct that will
reach beyond the traditional regulatory framework of adequate protection
of public health and safety to minimize socio-political and economic
consequences caused by radioactive releases from accidents. The March
2011 earthquake and tsunami that hit Japan, causing the unprecedented
accident at Fukushima Dai-ichi, exposed potential vulnerabilities of
nuclear power plants to extreme events. This prompted ASME President
Victoria A. Rockwell to commission a Presidential Task Force to review
the events, examine the global implications and make recommendations on
ASME’s role in addressing issues and lessons learned.
The ASME Task Force built upon the growing body of technical assessments of these events and examined the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident in the context of the broader lessons learned from a half-century of nuclear operations. From the combination of assessments and reviews of the critical elements involved in the accident scenarios, the ASME Task Force developed recommendations for a cohesive framework to enhance the safe operation of nuclear plants. The ASME Task Force’s recommendations are included in the report, Forging a New Nuclear Safety Construct.
“The Task Force review and recommendations provided in this report will hopefully launch activities within ASME, and working with other professional engineering societies, industry organizations, and government agencies worldwide, recommend global actions to prevent or mitigate the consequences of severe nuclear accidents,” stated Victoria Rockwell. “I was pleased that Dr. Nils Diaz, past Chairman of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and Dr. Regis Matzie, former Senior Vice President and Chief Technology Officer at Westinghouse Electric Company, agreed to serve as Chair and Vice Chair, respectively, of the ASME Presidential Task Force on Response to Japan Nuclear Power Plant Events”.
The ASME Task Force built upon the growing body of technical assessments of these events and examined the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident in the context of the broader lessons learned from a half-century of nuclear operations. From the combination of assessments and reviews of the critical elements involved in the accident scenarios, the ASME Task Force developed recommendations for a cohesive framework to enhance the safe operation of nuclear plants. The ASME Task Force’s recommendations are included in the report, Forging a New Nuclear Safety Construct.
“The Task Force review and recommendations provided in this report will hopefully launch activities within ASME, and working with other professional engineering societies, industry organizations, and government agencies worldwide, recommend global actions to prevent or mitigate the consequences of severe nuclear accidents,” stated Victoria Rockwell. “I was pleased that Dr. Nils Diaz, past Chairman of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and Dr. Regis Matzie, former Senior Vice President and Chief Technology Officer at Westinghouse Electric Company, agreed to serve as Chair and Vice Chair, respectively, of the ASME Presidential Task Force on Response to Japan Nuclear Power Plant Events”.
July 16, 2003
The Honorable Nils J. Diaz
Chairman
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555-0001
SUBJECT: SAFETY CULTURE
Dear Chairman Diaz:
During the 503rd meeting of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, June 12-13, 2003, we met with representatives of the public, the industry, and the NRC staff (References 1, a through l) to discuss the collective understanding and attributes of safety culture at nuclear power plants. We also had the benefit of the documents referenced.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The existing regulations provide an appropriate framework for monitoring the impact of licensee safety culture on performance.
The current regulations do address several important attributes of safety culture, albeit at a fairly high level. Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50 requires the licensees to establish a quality assurance program. Quality assurance means “all those planned and systematic actions necessary to provide adequate confidence that a structure, system, or component will perform satisfactorily in service.”
Criterion XVI of Appendix B, “Corrective Actions,” states: “Measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, and nonconformances are promptly identified and corrected.”
Conditions that will promote quality as envisaged in Appendix B include adherence to procedures and an effective corrective action program. These are attributes of safety culture. Furthermore, a questioning attitude, conservative decisionmaking, personal accountability, and attention to detail are essential elements of an effective corrective action program. Again, these are elements of safety culture.
We conclude that the regulatory framework for monitoring aspects of safety culture is largely in place. This framework is appropriately performance based. Broader evaluations of safety culture, such as management emphasis on safety and personnel attitudes, belong to the industry.
The Honorable Nils J. Diaz
Chairman
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555-0001
SUBJECT: SAFETY CULTURE
Dear Chairman Diaz:
During the 503rd meeting of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, June 12-13, 2003, we met with representatives of the public, the industry, and the NRC staff (References 1, a through l) to discuss the collective understanding and attributes of safety culture at nuclear power plants. We also had the benefit of the documents referenced.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The existing regulations provide an appropriate framework for monitoring the impact of licensee safety culture on performance.
The current regulations do address several important attributes of safety culture, albeit at a fairly high level. Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50 requires the licensees to establish a quality assurance program. Quality assurance means “all those planned and systematic actions necessary to provide adequate confidence that a structure, system, or component will perform satisfactorily in service.”
Criterion XVI of Appendix B, “Corrective Actions,” states: “Measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, and nonconformances are promptly identified and corrected.”
Conditions that will promote quality as envisaged in Appendix B include adherence to procedures and an effective corrective action program. These are attributes of safety culture. Furthermore, a questioning attitude, conservative decisionmaking, personal accountability, and attention to detail are essential elements of an effective corrective action program. Again, these are elements of safety culture.
We conclude that the regulatory framework for monitoring aspects of safety culture is largely in place. This framework is appropriately performance based. Broader evaluations of safety culture, such as management emphasis on safety and personnel attitudes, belong to the industry.
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