Statement at IAEA Symposium on International Safeguards: Linking Strategy, Implementation and People
by IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano
Good morning, Ladies and Gentlemen,I am pleased to welcome you all to this 2014 IAEA Symposium on International Safeguards.
The safeguards resolution adopted at the IAEA General Conference last month recognised that "effective and efficient safeguards implementation requires a cooperative effort between the Agency and States."
This cooperative effort takes place every day through the work of our inspectors in the field and our headquarters staff in Vienna, together with their counterparts in the 181 countries in which we implement safeguards.
But this Symposium also has a very important part to play. Every four years, it brings together key interested parties from the Agency and Member States for an in-depth, week-long examination of key issues in nuclear verification.
And, as all of us know, the field of nuclear verification never stands still.
The number of nuclear facilities coming under IAEA safeguards continues to grow steadily - by 12 percent in the past five years alone. So does the amount of nuclear material to be safeguarded. It has risen by around 14 percent in that period.
With 72 nuclear power plants under construction, and many additional countries considering the introduction of nuclear power in the coming years, that trend looks very likely to continue.
And that is just nuclear power. The use of nuclear science and technology in other peaceful applications - in industry, medicine and agriculture, for example - also continues to grow.
Funding for the Agency has not kept pace with growing demand for our services and is unlikely to do so in the coming years. That means we must constantly find ways of working more effectively and more efficiently in all areas of our work, including safeguards.
I will briefly highlight some key developments in the Agency's safeguards activities since the last Symposium in 2010.
Probably the most encouraging news is that our analytical capabilities have significantly improved.
In September 2011, we formally opened the new extension to the IAEA Clean Laboratory at Seibersdorf, near Vienna.
It contains a state-of-the-art Large Geometry Secondary Ion Mass Spectrometer, which greatly improves the Agency's ability to independently analyse environmental samples for safeguards. In fact, it has made us a leader in particle analysis.
The spectrometer is now in routine operation supporting critical safeguards operations.
Two years later, in September 2013, we inaugurated the new Nuclear Material Laboratory for safeguards analysis. Analytical functions are being gradually moved from the old building to the new laboratory, a process which will be completed by the end of this year.
The Nuclear Material Laboratory gives the Department of Safeguards an enhanced set of independent verification capabilities in areas such as the analysis of uranium, plutonium, spent fuel and high-activity liquid waste samples, as well as in archiving samples safely and securely.
This comprehensive modernisation of the safeguards laboratories was one of the most important projects which the Agency has ever undertaken. We are proud that work on both laboratories was completed on schedule and within budget.
As you may know, we have begun an update of the safeguards IT system under a project known as MoSaIc. The system is becoming outdated and it will struggle to cope with the volume of information it is required to manage. The major modernization now underway will improve performance, security and reliability, strengthening the day-to-day implementation of safeguards.
Also on the positive side, the number of States with additional protocols in force continues to rise. It now stands at 124, compared with 102 when the last Safeguards Symposium began.
I urge remaining States to conclude additional protocols as soon as possible. I also ask the 12 States without NPT safeguards agreements in force to bring such agreements into force without delay.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
The Agency continues to implement safeguards through consideration of a State's nuclear activities and related technical capabilities as a whole, rather than on a facility basis. We refer to this as the State-level concept and it has been the subject of extensive dialogue with Member States.
The State-level concept does not entail the introduction of any additional rights or obligations on the part of either States or the Agency, nor does it involve any modification in the interpretation of existing rights and obligations.
It is applicable to all States, but strictly within the scope of each individual State's safeguards agreement.
State-level safeguards approaches have so far been implemented for the 53 States under integrated safeguards. Our focus for the immediate future is on updating these existing approaches. The Agency plans to progressively develop and implement State-level approaches with respect to other States.
We recognize the need to apply State-specific factors objectively, consistently and in accordance with clear and established guidelines, based on technical considerations. We aim to keep the frequency and intensity of routine inspections for States to the minimum level necessary to produce credible safeguards conclusions.
We will continue to consult closely with Member States on safeguards implementation. Discussions during the Symposium this week will be an important part of that process.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Safeguards implementation in the Islamic Republic of Iran remains one of the main issues on the Agency's agenda. In November 2013, the Agency and Iran agreed to cooperate further to resolve all present and past issues under a Framework for Cooperation.
Iran has implemented most of the practical measures agreed under the Framework, but not all of them.
Separately, our Board of Governors authorised the Agency to undertake monitoring and verification in relation to nuclear-related measures set out in a Joint Plan of Action agreed between the E3+3 and Iran.
This has meant a large additional workload for safeguards staff. In fact, our verification effort in Iran has doubled under the Joint Plan of Action. This has had significant resource implications, not just financially. Many of our most experienced inspectors and analysts are now working on the Iran file full-time, which means they are not available to work on other dossiers.
The Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of nuclear material declared by Iran under its Safeguards Agreement. However, the Agency is not in a position to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, and therefore to conclude that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities.
In order to resolve all outstanding issues, it is very important that Iran implements, in a timely manner, all practical measures agreed under the Framework for Cooperation, and that it proposes new measures that we can agree upon for the next step.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
You have a comprehensive and extremely interesting programme over the next five days. I understand that there will be more presentations at this Symposium than at any time in the past. This is very encouraging.
Safeguards make a vital contribution to international peace and security. I thank all of you for your participation in this Symposium, which I am confident will help all of us to do our jobs more effectively and efficiently. The Agency will continue to engage in open, active dialogue on safeguards matters with Member States.
I wish you every success with your discussions and look forward to learning about the outcome.
Thank you.http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/2014/amsp2014n19.html
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