China Should Remain Prudent in Its Nuclear Fuel Path Mark Hibbs Nuclear Energy Brief, November 22, 2010

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Aspiring to be a global leader in nuclear power generation by mid-century, China is on the verge of investment decisions that could commit the country to fuel its rapidly growing fleet of nuclear power reactors with plutonium. Should China soon take major and possibly irreversible steps to go that route, the domestic, regional, and global impact of its actions will be profound.
Key Chinese nuclear energy organizations aim to build a series of large fast breeder reactors (FBRs) fueled by plutonium that would be supplied by a commercial-scale spent fuel reprocessing complex. If these projects move forward as their advocates intend, China’s nuclear energy ambitions would match those of Japan and major European nuclear energy-generating countries in fueling reactors with both low-enriched uranium and plutonium. The uranium poses few economic, security, and proliferation challenges. The plutonium, however, does.
Four decades ago, Japan and Europe set out on a similar path that eventually failed to demonstrate commercial viability of plutonium fast breeder programs for reasons of cost, technology, proliferation risk, safety challenges, and political acceptance. Thereafter, reprocessing in Japan and Europe was mostly driven by the need for a short-term solution to the lack of storage space for spent fuel from light water reactors (LWRs). Where storage space for spent fuel has not been an issue, including in the United States, commercial nuclear power programs have opted not to reprocess spent fuel and recycle plutonium.
Although China has thus far moved very cautiously in implementing a nuclear fuel cycle strategy, moving too quickly down its forecasted path could have detrimental effects. It’s unwise for China to commit itself to a rapid deployment of plutonium reactors and premature establishment of commercial-scale reprocessing, as that would burden China’s young nuclear power program with additional safety, security, and proliferation challenges and could prove unnecessarily costly to China.
Much more at: 
http://carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=41969