Gentlemen and Ladies, a bit of musing. Not new, perhaps, but it cannot,
I think, be repeated often enough. Pass it out if you think
worthwhile. Bill
Ok. But here we are;
so what do we do now?
That
is the most dangerous question asked in discussions of public policy.
I say that
because in most cases, by that time, the answer is, “unfortunately, there is no
good answer.”
That
reply stifles any other answer. But of
course, the timing is wrong. The answer
should have been preceded by such questions as,
“what do we know about the people
involved?
“what were we really trying to do to
them?
“how would those affected by our
actions view them?
“was what we were doing appropriate?
“how did our actions fit into the
world we thought we were trying to build?
“what were the costs in life,
property and civil institutions?
“how important was the issue or
country to us and in what terms?
“what could have been the
alternatives?
“would the policy they entailed
work?”
Like
so much of what we face today, leaping before looking avoids the truly
important question: “Why did we not think about consequences before we acted?”
The
answer to that question is, partially, ignorance. But this is only a
partial answer. And clinging to it does not, apparently, get
us very far. So, at the risk of
duplicating what I have written in the past and what others have written
and
are writing today, let me pose some of the questions that should have
been
asked. I will do so on the issue of
Afghanistan. They could, of course, be applied much more widely, indeed
on any
issue of public policy. Others, I am sure,
will think of better ones. I start with
these:
“what
do we know about the people involved?” At least up to about the end of the
twentieth century, Americans as a whole and officials as a group knew little
about Afghanistan. Information was
available, but it was little accessed and even less disseminated. The number of State Department and CIA
officers, who should have been the most enlightened group, who could read any
of the Afghan languages probably did not exceed a dozen or so. And those with an intimate or professional
knowledge of Afghan society, politics, economic affairs and culture almost
certainly was not more numerous. Good
works on Afghan history were available in Russian, French and English, but
those of real quality were rare. When I
set out in 1962 to write an analysis of Afghanistan for the Secretary of State,
I found few useful accounts. In general
terms, however, most students of world affairs knew that Britain had tried
three times to conquer Afghanistan and Russia had tried, but much more
intensively, once. Available knowledge
is now more available and there are more people who are trained to read it. Intervention has had at least this
benefit. We have now hundreds of
Americans who, weighed in the scale I saw in 1962, can be regarded as “experts,”
although one must question their empathy
for the people.
“what
were we really trying to do to the Afghans? In
my inquiry in 1962, I found that none of the key officials in the American aid program,
the embassy and the intelligence “station” could articulate an intelligible
policy objective. Moreover, their
activities, while severally fairly large-scale and sometimes individually beneficial, had
been undertaken piecemeal and did not add up to a coherent policy. The three main activities, the Helmand Valley
project, the construction of the Qandahar airport and the building of the
Kabul-Qandahar expressway either made no impact or very little on either the
Afghan economy or society. In my
projected strategy paper, I argued that America had minimal national interest
in Afghanistan and that what we should aim to accomplish was to keep Afghan
society and civic structure healthy and independent. Such a policy was supplemental rather than
intrusive, prudent rather than lavish and, above all, not provocative of the
Soviet Union. That remained, in large
part, our policy until the Soviet intervention in 1979 and was completely
overturned by American invasion of 2001. The Russians first and then we tried
to remake the society in our image. The
Russians fought for ten years and we have been fighting for seventeen years to
destroy a religious-led tribal system. Both of us failed.
“how would those affected by our actions
view them? We can go back at least
to the first British invasion to see the Afghan devotion to the simple idea of
being left alone. When the British
invaded the country in 1838, they entered a wasp’s nest. The Afghans wiped out a whole Anglo-Indian
army, giving the British their greatest defeat of the nineteenth century. The British fought two more major engagements
and spent decades fighting guerrilla/tribal forces on the southeastern (what
the British called the North West) frontier.
The Afghans never gave up and never changed their attitude. But, when India became independent and we and
the Russians left the Afghans alone, travelling around the country was a
delight. And safe. Everywhere I went in a 2,000 mile trek in
1962 I was treated as an honored guest.
Then the Russians invaded in 1979 and created two disasters: they destroyed much of the country and killed
huge numbers of Afghans; in doing so they bankrupted the Soviet Union and virtually
destroyed its army. We followed them and
created a similar disaster. Moral: the
Afghans don’t want any foreign interference and are willing to fight and die to
preserve their independence. They are
willing to take our money but they won’t accept our control.
“was what we were doing appropriate? That question must be refined: appropriate to whom and by what standard. Invading
another country was defined by
the Nuremberg Tribunal as a war crime. It
became operational under United States law, as specified by the
Constitution, by being anchored in a treaty under which the United
States joined the United
Nations. At the demand of the major
powers, the definition of “aggression” has always been legally
ill-defined; in
political terms it has depended on the acquiescence of the strong; but
in the
political terms of the victims and in moral terms, it is self evident.
In the view of the Afghans the British,
Soviet and U.S. invasions were crimes of aggression. The United States
justification for occupying
Afghanistan at the request of the Afghan government will not survive as
it did
not in Vietnam longer than the artificial governments survive. I When
the current regime is overthrown, the incoming new government, just
as in Vietnam, will repudiate its acts.
“how did our actions fit into the world we
thought we were trying to build? Realistically, the answer to this
question
is “time dependent.” What one generation
accepts, its successor may disavow. The
notion of quest for a better world dominating policy gave way twice in
the last century –
once in 1919 and once just at the end of the Second World War. In the
first instance it was replaced by the
quest for wealth behind the moat of the Atlantic Ocean and from roughly
1947 by
the belief that we could assure security by an aggressive foreign
policy. The latter trend continues. It has landed us in war after war
with no end
in sight. Yet, we continue to believe that what we are trying to do
works and even that it is building a better world.
“what were the costs?” Cost is the ultimate four-letter word. It covers a variety of acts and usually makes
us think only in financial terms, and thinking in that way tends to focus
our attention on the cost to us. But if we evaluate
costs in broader terms -- in life, property and civil institutions – we
get a truer picture. In Afghanistan,
that picture is ugly. No one really
knows how many people have been turned into refugees, been incapacitated, been “dwarfed,”
died or been killed. Scattered over
those categories is virtually the entire population. Physical destruction has been large-scale but
somewhat less than the tragic costs in Iraq and Syria because Afghanistan had
less to lose. The same might be said of
civic institutions. Afghanistan was
evolving from a primitive but coherent society into a true nation-state. Repeated and long lasting wars – a decade of
Soviet dismemberment, twelve years of the warlord-ridden strife and going-on
twenty years of American counterinsurgency – have brought out the worst of the
past and mingled it with contemporary tyranny. So, as
fragile native institutions are destroyed or collapse, they are replaced either
by completely foreign structures or by thinly disguised puppets. In everything from getting fresh water to
buying a house, the law is set by a mafia. And
the mafia is itself fragile so it acts like a pump to suck out of the society
its capacity to survive. Much of the
cost is hidden, but in sum we can say that it amounts to a generation of
Afghans. And, of course, the contagion
spreads not only to neighboring societies but also to us and our institutions,
concepts of law and civil liberties.
“how important was the issue or country to
us and in what terms? One of the
several ironies of Afghanistan is that America had almost no national interests
in it. The British had. They wanted to
protect the crown jewel of their empire, India.
The Soviet Union had more intangible ideological interests but even the
Politburo could not add them up as a convincing case for involvement. I doubt that anyone in Mr. Bush’s camp could
have made a better case. If we had a serious
interest, it was that everyone leave the Afghans to run their own affairs.
“what
could have been the alternatives? In
so far as there was a reason for our attack, it was not strategic;
rather it
was political and domestic. The Afghan government would
not release to us the man we blamed for the 9/11 attack, Usama bin
Ladin. That gave the Bushes a cause. Particularly George Jr. saw it
as an opening on the world stage. So, when the Afghans indicated a
face-saving way
around the issue of Bin Ladin’s guilt, we could not accept it. If we
had been
willing to negotiate, we could have accomplished what we said was our
requirement
without invasion. But, for domestic
political reasons, in Afghanistan as in Iraq, we opted for war.
“would
the policy diplomacy entailed have worked?”
Of course, we cannot be sure since we refused to try in Afghanistan.
But, the downside of diplomacy not working was of trivial cost while the
cost of mounting an invasion and multi-year occupation of the country
has
been monumental. In Iraq, the costs on both sides of
this divide were even more pronounced. And, I believe, incurring them
was unnecessary. I
personally met with Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz on the eve of our
invasion
and found his government ready to meet almost any demand. But, as he
told me, his government thought an
attempt to keep the peace would be in vain because the US government was
determined
on war. When I returned from Baghdad and met with senior officials of
our
government, I found that Tariq Aziz had judged us aright. We, or at
least President Bush, were on the move.
So, back to my main point: until we ask
the right questions in advance, the answers we could consider after events take place will evince little room for intelligent, effective and economical
policy. And, in that frame of mind,
we will take Step One. That is whatever seems required by our own interests. Having taken
that step, we narrow the range of our options and find that it is logical to take as
its offshoot, Step Two. Then, Step Three is likely to seem the
only feasible next move. So, in the
process we become not the masters of our fate but the captive of events that
possibly never needed to have been begun and are likely to lead us in a direction
opposite to our interests.
Only half in jest, I suggest that every
would-be statesman be required to follow the latest fad among the
young: he should submit to being tattooed – perhaps on his forehead --
with the
phrase LOOK BEFORE LEAPING.
William
R. Polk January 14, 2019
