Michele Kearney's Nuclear Wire

Major Energy and Environmental News and Commentary affecting the Nuclear Industry.

Sunday, June 25, 2017

How Can Nuclear Construction Costs Be Reduced?


How Can Nuclear Construction Costs Be Reduced?
How Can Nuclear Construction Costs Be Reduced?
How Can Nuclear Construction Costs Be Reduced?
http://ansnuclearcafe.org/2013/01/24/how-can-nuclear-construction-costs-be-reduced/#sthash.enpi5qTn.4uubLv45.dpbs

(11) C of C 4-22-17 Earth Day Debate About "Nuclear Power vs Nuclear Free" - YouTube

(11) C of C 4-22-17 Earth Day Debate About "Nuclear Power vs Nuclear Free" - YouTube

Czech Republic nuclear power station hosts bikini contest to choose interns | Europe | DW | 25.06.2017

Czech Republic nuclear power station hosts bikini contest to choose interns | Europe | DW | 25.06.2017

WCS mulls resuming nuke waste storage license - Midland Reporter-Telegram

WCS mulls resuming nuke waste storage license - Midland Reporter-Telegram

Seeding The Clouds - Should We Mess With Our Earth's Climate?

Seeding The Clouds - Should We Mess With Our Earth's Climate?



https://www.forbes.com/sites/jamesconca/2017/06/22/seeding-the-clouds-should-we-mess-with-our-earths-climate/#49601078696c

National Academy of Sciences Refutes Mark Jacobson & His Renewable-Energy Delusion | National Review

National Academy of Sciences Refutes Mark Jacobson & His Renewable-Energy Delusion | National Review

Environmental Groups Challenge TVA Nuclear Reactor Plan


Environmental Groups Challenge TVA Nuclear Reactor Plan

Environmental groups are challenging the Tennessee Valley Authority's proposal to use a Tennessee nuclear reactor design site abandoned in the 1970s to develop new small modular reactors.


https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/tennessee/articles/2017-06-25/environmental-groups-challenge-tva-nuclear-reactor-plan

What Sharia Prescribes: Same as the Ten Commandments?

What Sharia Prescribes: Same as the Ten Commandments?

Friday, June 23, 2017

Preemptive strike against North Korea not an option, says former Pentagon chief Perry | News | DW | 22.06.2017

Preemptive strike against North Korea not an option, says former Pentagon chief Perry | News | DW | 22.06.2017

Sorry Mr. Ruckelshaus , But Your Old Agency Is a Shambles

Sorry
Mr. Ruckelshaus, But
Your Old Agency Is a Shambles


https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2017/6/regulation-v40n2-7_2.pdf#page=6

Secretary Perry backs off on budget defense, touts small nukes in hearings | Utility Dive

Secretary Perry backs off on budget defense, touts small nukes in hearings | Utility Dive

DOE Secretary Perry

Perry Walks Back Interim Storage Plans
Senators Grill Perry On Yucca Nuclear Storage Plans
Sen. Alexander Urges Administration to Support Private Nuclear Waste Storage
Moniz: Perry Climate Comment ‘Flies In The Face Of Science’
Perry Invokes Fukushima In Reviving Yucca Nuclear Waste Fight
Proposed Interim Storage Sight Could Face Legal Hurdles
Perry Floats Interim Storage Site In Nevada
Nevada Gov Calls Foul: Blindsided
Yucca Mountain Funding A Bright Spot For Republicans Trump's Budget
Energy Sec Rick Perry Warns Fukushima Could Happen Here If Us Doesn't Deal With Its Nuclear Waste
Perry Defends Cuts To Energy Research, Cites ‘Fiduciary Responsibility’
Perry Cites ‘Moral Obligation’ To Build Yucca
Perry: Nuclear Energy On The 'Front Burner'

U.S. Uranium Production, Prices, and Employment All Fell in 2016 - The Energy Collective

U.S. Uranium Production, Prices, and Employment All Fell in 2016 - The Energy Collective

Why Investing in the Big Four German Utilities is Still Not for the Faint of Heart - The Energy Collective

Why Investing in the Big Four German Utilities is Still Not for the Faint of Heart - The Energy Collective

We participated in talks with North Korean representatives. This is what we learned. - The Washington Post

We participated in talks with North Korean representatives. This is what we learned. - The Washington Post

TASS: Business & Economy - India’s watchdog gives green light to construction of second stage of nuclear power plant

TASS: Business & Economy - India’s watchdog gives green light to construction of second stage of nuclear power plant

Rosatom, Ethiopia, Sign MOU On Nuclear Power - News - Nuclear Power News - Nuclear Street - Nuclear Power Plant News, Jobs, and Careers

Rosatom, Ethiopia, Sign MOU On Nuclear Power - News - Nuclear Power News - Nuclear Street - Nuclear Power Plant News, Jobs, and Careers

US Nuclear Power Producers Are Asking for State Help - Market Realist

US Nuclear Power Producers Are Asking for State Help - Market Realist

Former Senator John Edwards Representing Thousands of United States Veterans Injured in Nuclear Disaster | Business Wire

Former Senator John Edwards Representing Thousands of United States Veterans Injured in Nuclear Disaster | Business Wire

9th Circ. Allows Sailors' $1B Fukushima Suit To Proceed - Law360

9th Circ. Allows Sailors' $1B Fukushima Suit To Proceed - Law360

Third-gen Chinese nuclear technology arrives in Karachi | Asia Times

Third-gen Chinese nuclear technology arrives in Karachi | Asia Times

Nuclear Can Be Friends With Renewables -- If It's Modular | Greentech Media

Nuclear Can Be Friends With Renewables -- If It's Modular | Greentech Media

IEA Official Says Green Goals Doomed Without Nuclear - The American Interest

IEA Official Says Green Goals Doomed Without Nuclear - The American Interest

Hinkley Point C: watchdog confirms fears of political vanity project | Nils Pratley | UK news | The Guardian

Hinkley Point C: watchdog confirms fears of political vanity project | Nils Pratley | UK news | The Guardian

Develop nuclear plan B in case 'risky' Hinkley C fails, warns NAO | theenergyst.com

Develop nuclear plan B in case 'risky' Hinkley C fails, warns NAO | theenergyst.com

National Audit Office finds Hinkley Point C is not value for money - Bristol Post

National Audit Office finds Hinkley Point C is not value for money - Bristol Post

National Audit Office slams Hinkley Point | News | LondonlovesBusiness.com

National Audit Office slams Hinkley Point | News | LondonlovesBusiness.com

NAO slams failure to explore 'alternative approaches' to Hinkley Point

NAO slams failure to explore 'alternative approaches' to Hinkley Point

UK watchdog warns on increased costs of Hinkley nuclear plant - Power Engineering International

UK watchdog warns on increased costs of Hinkley nuclear plant - Power Engineering International

Hinkley Point is a terrible deal. May must show courage and cancel it | Simon Jenkins | Opinion | The Guardian

Hinkley Point is a terrible deal. May must show courage and cancel it | Simon Jenkins | Opinion | The Guardian

UK's Hinkley Point C deal 'locks consumers into risky, expensive project': NAO - Electric Power | Platts News Article & Story

UK's Hinkley Point C deal 'locks consumers into risky, expensive project': NAO - Electric Power | Platts News Article & Story

UK nuclear plant to cost consumers 'billions more': Auditors | Saudi Gazette

UK nuclear plant to cost consumers 'billions more': Auditors | Saudi Gazette

Projects like Hinkley Point look dated before construction even starts

Projects like Hinkley Point look dated before construction even starts

NRC Actions in Response to the Japan Nuclear Accident: Commission Briefings

Actions in Response to the Japan Nuclear Accident: Commission Briefings

The following table provides access to materials related to briefings presented to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in connection with the Japan Nuclear Accident at Fukushima Dai-ichi.
This page includes links to files in non-HTML format. See Plugins, Viewers, and Other Tools for more information.
Date Subject
07/09/2015 Briefing on the Mitigation of Beyond Design Basis Events (MBDBE) Rulemaking
04/30/2015 Briefing on the Status of Lessons Learned from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident
07/31/2014 Briefing on the Status of Lessons Learned from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident
01/10/2014 Briefing on the NRC Staff's Recommendations to Disposition Fukushima Near-Term Task Force (NTTF) Recommendation 1 on Improving NRC's Regulatory Framework
01/06/2014 Briefing on Flooding and Other Extreme Weather Events
01/06/2014 Briefing on Spent Fuel Pool Safety and Consideration of Expedited Transfer of Spent Fuel to Dry Casks
04/23/2013 Briefing on the Status of Lessons Learned from the Fukushima Dia-ichi Accident
01/09/2013 Briefing on Venting Systems for Mark I and Mark II Containments
08/07/2012 Briefing on the Status of Lessons Learned from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident
10/11/2011 Briefing on the Japan Near Term Task Force Report – Prioritization of Recommendations
09/14/2011 Briefing on the Japan Near Term Task Force Report – Short Term Actions
07/19/2011 Briefing on the Task Force Review of NRC Processes and Regulations Following Events in Japan
06/15/2011 Briefing on the Progress of the Task Force Review of NRC Processes and Regulations Following Events in Japan
05/12/2011 Briefing on the Progress of the Task Force Review of NRC Processes and Regulations Following the Events in Japan
04/28/2011 Part 2 - Briefing on the Status of NRC Response to Events in Japan and Briefing on Station Blackout – Security Issues (Closed – Ex. 3)
04/28/2011 Briefing on the Status of NRC Response to Events in Japan and Briefing on Station Blackout
03/21/2011 Briefing on NRC Response to Recent Nuclear Events in Japan

NRC: Plant-Specific Japan Lessons-Learned Activities

Plant-Specific Japan Lessons-Learned Activities

Plant Implementation StatusThe following alphabetical list of operating nuclear power reactors provides access to plant-specific actions related to the Japan Nuclear Accident at Fukushima Dai-ichi. Specifically, these actions include Orders and Requests for Information (RFIs) issued by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), as well as the related responses submitted by the plant licensees.
A - C D - L M - Q R - W
Arkansas Nuclear 1
Arkansas Nuclear 2
Beaver Valley 1
Beaver Valley 2
Braidwood 1
Braidwood 2
Browns Ferry 1
Browns Ferry 2
Browns Ferry 3
Brunswick 1
Brunswick 2
Byron 1
Byron 2
Callaway
Calvert Cliffs 1
Calvert Cliffs 2
Catawba 1
Catawba 2
Clinton
Columbia Generating Station
Comanche Peak 1
Comanche Peak 2
Cooper
Crystal River 3
D.C. Cook 1
D.C. Cook 2
Davis-Besse
Diablo Canyon 1
Diablo Canyon 2
Dresden 2
Dresden 3
Duane Arnold
Farley 1
Farley 2
Fermi 2
FitzPatrick
Fort Calhoun
Ginna
Grand Gulf 1
Harris 1
Hatch 1
Hatch 2
Hope Creek 1
Indian Point 2
Indian Point 3
Kewaunee
La Salle 1
La Salle 2
Limerick 1
Limerick 2
McGuire 1
McGuire 2
Millstone 2
Millstone 3
Monticello
Nine Mile Point 1
Nine Mile Point 2
North Anna 1
North Anna 2
Oconee 1
Oconee 2
Oconee 3
Oyster Creek
Palisades
Palo Verde 1
Palo Verde 2
Palo Verde 3
Peach Bottom 2
Peach Bottom 3
Perry 1
Pilgrim 1
Point Beach 1
Point Beach 2
Prairie Island 1
Prairie Island 2
Quad Cities 1
Quad Cities 2
River Bend 1
Robinson 2
Saint Lucie 1
Saint Lucie 2
Salem 1
Salem 2
San Onofre 2
San Onofre 3
Seabrook 1
Sequoyah 1
Sequoyah 2
South Texas 1
South Texas 2
Summer
Surry 1
Surry 2
Susquehanna 1
Susquehanna 2
Three Mile Island 1
Turkey Point 3
Turkey Point 4
Vermont Yankee
Vogtle 1
Vogtle 2
Waterford 3
Watts Bar 1
Watts Bar 2
Wolf Creek 1
Bonsai tree with green leaves. Black trunk and ground appears in front of a setting red sun.
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NRC: Mitigation of Beyond-Design-Basis Events Proposed Rule issued for Public Comment

Mitigation of Beyond-Design-Basis Events
Proposed Rule issued for Public Comment

Quick Links:
Enhancements Under the Proposed Mitigation Strategies Rule
The March 11, 2011, accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant in Japan was caused by an earthquake and tsunami that significantly exceeded the design basis of the facility.  The tsunami flooded important safety systems at the plant, resulting in an extended loss of electrical power.  This loss of electrical power prevented operators from adequately cooling the reactor cores, which led to overheating, core damage, and the release of radioactive materials to the environment.
The NRC took a number of actions following the accident to strengthen the protection of U.S. nuclear plants against events that could exceed a plant’s design basis.  These included issuing orders and requiring licensees to conduct several evaluations. Now the NRC is moving forward in making permanent some of the lessons we've learned from the Fukushima nuclear accident through the development of a new regulation.  The Commission has directed the staff to seek public comments on a proposed rule for mitigating "beyond design basis events," which can be stronger than a plant's current design. The Commission made a few changes to the proposed rule, which consolidates several of the most safety significant recommendations of the NRC's task force report from shortly after the events at Fukushima.
The public can comment on the proposed rule until February 11, 2016. To view the proposed rule or submit comments, go to http://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2014-0240. You may also e-mail comments to Rulemaking.Comments@nrc.gov. The staff is also planning a public meeting during the comment period, and we'll post the meeting notice on our public website.
The staff will consider the public's comments on the proposed rule and expects to provide a final rule to the Commission for its consideration in December 2016. The NRC staff expects the rule, if approved, would require plants to fully comply within approximately two years (2019-2020), with the exact date varying from plant to plant. Although that seems far away, much of the safety benefit from the rule is already achieved by two orders that are discussed below. Nearly all U.S. plants will comply with those orders by the end of 2016. Safety is being enhanced well before the final rule.
This proposed rule would apply the requirements of two existing orders, Mitigating Strategies (EA-12-049) and Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation (EA-12-051), to any operating or future U.S. nuclear power plant. The Mitigating Strategies Order ensures that a plant will have sufficient procedures, strategies, and equipment to indefinitely cool the reactor core and spent fuel, as well as protect the reactor's containment, if it loses power. The Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation Order requires that the plants ensure they can monitor spent fuel pool water levels. These two orders are already being implemented across the nuclear fleet.
The proposed rule also incorporates many other task force recommendations. It also address the concerns of several Fukushima-related petitions that were submitted by members of the public to change the NRC's regulations. These additional issues include:
  • Mitigating Strategies (Recommendation 4) and Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation (Recommendation 7):
The previously-issued orders would be written into the NRC's permanent rules, so that their requirements would apply to any future reactors.
  • Onsite Emergency Response Capabilities (Recommendation 8):
Plants have a variety of response guidelines (FLEX support guidelines, emergency operating procedures, etc.), each of which would be used by licensees depending on the specific situation. The proposed rule would ensure plants can smoothly transition between the different types of response guidelines.
  • Emergency Plans to Address prolonged Station Blackout and Multiunit Events (part of Recommendation 9):
The proposed rule clarifies requirements for plants to be able to monitor and assess potential radiation doses from events involving more than one reactor or spent fuel pool at once. Plants are currently implementing this ability through a voluntary initiative. The proposed rule also simplifies technology requirements for the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS), one method for plants to communicate with the NRC during an event. Licensees voluntarily modernized the system (Recommendation 9.4).
  • Command and Control Structure and Qualification (Recommendation 10.2)
The proposed rule ensures plants' decision-makers are properly qualified and have the proper level of authority and oversight.
  • Enhanced Onsite Emergency Response Resources (Recommendation 11.1)
The proposed rule requires plants to have enough onsite resources to address all units at a site during a prolonged station blackout and also that they be able to deliver equipment to the site despite damage to offsite roads, etc., and infrastructure.
  • Petitions for Rulemaking from the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) (PRM-50-97, PRM-50-98, PRM-50-101, and PRN-50-102) and Mr. Thomas Popik (PRM-50-96)
Collectively, the NRDC petitions for rulemaking rely solely on Near-Term Task Force Report Recommendations 4, 7, 8, and 9, discussed above. The rulemaking addresses Mr. Popik's petition to the extent that it establishes a means of assuring long-term cooling and unattended water makeup to spent fuel pools. Separate from this rulemaking, the NRC will further consider whether requirements are needed for licensees to address geomagnetic storms, which was another part of Mr. Popik's petition.
Furthermore, the proposed rule incorporates information from the plants' reevaluated earthquake and flooding hazards. Each plant's mitigating strategies, which are used to meet the rule's requirements, must address the reevaluated hazards.
One of the changes the Commission directed the staff to make in the proposed rule involves the treatment of Severe Accident Management Guidelines, or SAMGs, which a plant would use in responding to very unlikely accidents that involve damage to the reactor. The Commission directed that the SAMGs should continue to be implemented voluntarily.  Based on the Commission's direction, the NRC will provide periodic oversight of SAMGs through its Reactor Oversight Process.  Another Commission change to the proposed rule removes proposed design requirements for new reactor applicants.  Instead, the new reactors would be subject to the same performance-based criteria that applies to the currently-licensed fleet.
Process Overview

Related Documents:

Learn more about the NRC's rulemaking process.

NRC Mitigation Strategies

Mitigation Strategies

Mitigation Strategies Order

Mitigating Strategies LogoAt Fukushima, flooding from the tsunami disabled internal electrical power systems after the earthquake had cut off external power sources, leaving the plants with only a few hours' worth of battery power.  Nuclear power plants need electrical power 24 hours per day, even when the nuclear reactors are shut down, to run equipment that cools the reactor core and spent nuclear fuel. The NRC issued a Mitigation Strategies Order on March 12, 2012, requiring all U.S. nuclear power plants to implement strategies that will allow them to cope without their permanent electrical power sources for an indefinite amount of time These strategies must keep the reactor core and spent fuel cool, as well as protect the thick concrete containment buildings that surround each reactor.  The mitigation strategies are expected to use a combination of currently installed equipment (e.g., steam-powered pumps), additional portable equipment that is stored on-site, and equipment that can be flown in or trucked in from support centers.
Process Overview
Mitigating Strategies: Safely Responding to Extreme Events (NUREG/BR-0523)
Mitigation Strategies
Related Documents:
For plant-specific documents, visit our Plant-Specific Japan Lessons-Learned Activities page.

NRC Seismic Reevaluations

Seismic Reevaluations

Seismic Reevaluations Operating reactor sites are using present-day information to reevaluate the earthquake effects—or hazards—that could impact their site.  These newly reevaluated hazards, if worse than what the plant had originally calculated, will be analyzed to determine if plant structures, systems, and/or components need to be updated to protect against the new hazard.  The NRC will review each step in the analysis process and take action to require plant changes as necessary.
Process Overview
Related Documents:
For plant-specific documents, visit our Plant-Specific Japan Lessons-Learned Activities page.

NRC Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation Order

Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation Order

Spent Fuel Pool Logo During the accident at Fukushima, the plants lost their ability to cool the spent fuel pools. Plant operators couldn't determine how much water was in the pools during the accident, which was a problem. If enough water boiled away or was otherwise lost, the spent fuel rods could emerge from the receding water and potentially release significant amounts of radiation.  Weeks later it was learned that the spent fuel was always covered, but the information gap diverted significant attention and extremely limited resources from more important tasks during the accident. The NRC issued an Order on March 12, 2012, requiring all U.S. nuclear power plants to install water level instrumentation in their spent fuel pools. The instrumentation must remotely report at least three distinct water levels: 1) normal level; 2) low level but still enough to shield workers above the pools from radiation; and 3) a level near the top of the spent fuel rods where more water should be added without delay.
Process Overview
Related Documents:
For plant-specific documents, visit our Plant-Specific Japan Lessons-Learned Activities page.

NRC Flooding Reevaluations


Flooding Reevaluations

Flooding Reevaluations Operating reactor sites are using present-day information to reevaluate the flooding effects—or hazards—that could impact their site.  These newly reevaluated hazards, if worse than what the plant had originally calculated, will be analyzed to determine if plant structures, systems, and/or components need to be updated to protect against the new hazard.  The NRC will review each step in the analysis process and take action to require plant changes as necessary.
Related Documents:
For plant-specific documents, visit our Plant-Specific Japan Lessons-Learned Activities page.

The NRC’s Regulatory Framework (Recommendation 1)


The NRC’s Regulatory Framework (Recommendation 1)

Regulatory FrameworkThe NRC requires U.S. nuclear power plants to be designed and built to safely withstand a set of unlikely but harmful events such as equipment failure, pipe breaks, and severe weather; these are called design-basis requirements. The nuclear power plants at Fukushima experienced flooding and seismic events that went beyond the design-basis levels set by the Japanese regulator.  The NRC's Near Term Task Force, in their examination of the Fukushima event, recognized that the NRC's design-basis requirements needed to be enhanced to deal with events that are very unlikely but beyond the current design-basis requirements. As a result, the task force recommended that the NRC establish a logical, systematic, and coherent regulatory framework that appropriately balances multiple layers of protection and risk considerations to deal with events beyond the current NRC design basis.
In December 2013, the NRC staff proposed three improvement activities in response to Recommendation 1. The Commission disapproved proceeding with two of the  proposed improvement activities, but directed the staff to re-evaluate those activities within the context of the Risk Management Regulatory Framework initiative.  No further action will be taken under the Japan Lessons Learned implementation effort.
Related Documents:

NRC: Hardened Vents and Filtration for Boiling Water Reactors with Mark I and Mark II containment designs

Hardened Vents and Filtration
(for Boiling Water Reactors with Mark I and Mark II containment designs)

Hardened Vents and Filtration The Fukushima accident disabled the plants' ability to cool their reactor cores, causing heat and pressure to build within the concrete containment buildings that surround the reactors. This buildup eventually damaged the buildings and made it easier for radioactive material to reach the environment. The NRC issued an Order on March 12, 2012, requiring all U.S. nuclear power plants with the Fukushima-style containment design to install a reliable, hardened vent that can remove heat and pressure before potential damage to a reactor core occurs. This not only helps preserve the integrity of the containment building, but can also help delay reactor core damage or melting.  After issuing the order, additional NRC evaluations examined the benefits of venting after reactor core damage occurs.  In June 2013, the NRC modified the Order to ensure those vents will remain functional in the conditions following reactor core damage.  The NRC considered revising its regulations through the rulemaking process to include strategies for filtering or otherwise confining radioactive material that gets released as a reactor core is damaged. In August 2015, the Commission directed the staff not to proceed further with the rulemaking.
Process Overview
Related Documents:
For plant-specific documents, visit our Plant-Specific Japan Lessons-Learned Activities page.

NRC Plant Walkddowns of Seismic and Flooding Protection Features Re: Fukushima


Plant Walkdowns of Seismic and Flooding Protection Features

Plant Walkdowns, consisting of a round image with an artist's rendering of a man walking down stairs In light of the effects from the extreme earthquake and tsunami of March 11, 2011, on the nuclear power plants at Fukushima, the NRC concluded U.S. nuclear power plants needed to reaffirm their existing ability to resist quakes and flooding.  On March 12, 2012, the NRC asked U.S. nuclear power plants to perform a detailed inspection, or "walkdown," of their currently installed seismic and flooding protection features. The plants had to ensure the features met current requirements, and also identify, correct, and report any degraded conditions.  The plants completed their walkdowns by November 2012; NRC inspectors have done follow-up inspections and the agency has issued plant-specific assessments of the licensee's walkdown reports.
Related Documents:
Process Overview – Seismic Walkdowns
Seismic Walkdowns
Process Overview - Flooding Walkdowns
Flooding Walkdowns
For plant-specific documents, visit our Plant-Specific Japan Lessons-Learned Activities page.

NRC Reference Library on Fukushima

Reference Library

Reference Library logo, consisting of 3 books stacked together

Additional Information and Resources

For additional information and resources, see the following pages:

NRC: Japan Lessons Learned

Japan Lessons Learned

On March 11, 2011, a 9.0-magnitude earthquake struck Japan and was followed by a 45-foot tsunami, resulting in extensive damage to the nuclear power reactors at the Fukushima Dai-ichi facility. The NRC has taken significant action to enhance the safety of reactors in the United States based on the lessons learned from this accident. This page is intended to serve as a navigation hub to follow the NRC's progress in implementing the many different lessons-learned activities.

Mitigating Strategies Order (EA-12-049) Compliance Status (December 31, 2016)
NRC Staff Review of the IAEA Director General's Report "The Fukushima Daiichi Accident" (February 24, 2016)
Fukushima Water Contamination - Impacts on the U.S. West Coast (Updated January 2015)
A comparison of U.S. and Japanese regulatory requirements in effect at the time of the Fukushima accident (December 6, 2013)
Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) Follow-up and Post-Fukushima Mission (February 11, 2014)
a brown circle with a brown graduation cap in the center

What Are the Lessons Learned from Fukushima?

a brown drawing of an instrument guage with the pointer showing the output

Plant-Specific Japan Lessons-Learned Activities

a brown circle outline with a brown, rectangle on and off switch in the middle of the circle with the swith in the On position and the words On and Off

Mitigation
Strategies

a brown outline of a domed nuclear reactor building with a white square representing a reactor and a connected vent stack with a white dotted line arrow going up the vent stack

Hardened Vents & Filtration

a brown circle with a 3 sided rectangle with short end top open in the center; inside the rectangle are 3 horizontal arrows pointing from the right to left side with the lower arrow having 6 vertical bars or lines tight together extending down to the bottom short end of the rectangle

Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation Order

a brown circle with a graph representation in the center

Seismic Reevaluations

a brown circle with brown water covering the lower half of the circle

Flooding
Reevaluations

a brown circle outline with a brown shape of a man wearing a hard hat, holding a flashlight and walking down stairs

Plant Walkdowns of Seismic & Flooding Protection Features

a brown bell image with two curved lines on either side, signifying the bell is ringing

Emergency Preparedness – Staffing & Communications

a drawn image of a brown loose-leaf binder page with two paragraphs of simulated written information each with a large check mark to the left of each paragraph.

Mitigation of
Beyond-Design-Basis
Events Rulemaking

a brown circle with six equally sized rectangles forming what appears to be a window

Regulatory Framework (Recommendation 1)

   
a brown circle with three brown bookends showing with one slightly askew from the other two books

Reference Library

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NRC: What are the Lessons Learned from Fukushima?


What are the Lessons Learned from Fukushima?

Lessons Learned Logo After the Fukushima accident, a task force of senior NRC staff reviewed the circumstances of the event to determine what lessons could be learned. In July 2011, the task force provided recommendations to enhance U.S. reactor safety, and these became the foundation of the NRC's post-Fukushima activities. The Commission then approved a three-tiered prioritization of the recommendations as summarized below (note that Recommendation 1 is being addressed outside of the three tiers).
Post Fukushima Safety

Tier 1 Activities

Activity Brief Description NRC Addressing by…
Mitigation Strategies
a brown circle outline with a brown, rectangle on and off switch in the middle of the circle with the swith in the On position and the words On and Off
To enhance the capability to maintain plant safety during a prolonged loss of electrical power. Order
Containment Venting System
a brown outline of a domed nuclear reactor building with a white square representing a reactor and a connected vent stack with a white dotted line arrow going up the vent stack
To provide a reliable hardened containment vent system for boiling water reactors (BWRs) with Mark I or Mark II containment designs. Order
Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation
a brown circle with a 3 sided rectangle with short end top open in the center; inside the rectangle are 3 horizontal arrows pointing from the right to left side with the lower arrow having 6 vertical bars or lines tight together extending down to the bottom short end of the rectangle
To provide a reliable wide-range indication of water level in spent fuel storage pools. Order
Seismic Reevaluations
a brown circle with a graph representation in the center
To reanalyze potential seismic effects using present-day information to determine if safety upgrades are needed. Request for Information
Flooding Hazard Reevaluations
a brown circle with brown water covering the lower half of the circle
To reanalyze potential flooding effects using present-day information to determine if safety upgrades are needed. Request for Information
Seismic and Flooding Walkdowns
a brown circle outline with a brown shape of a man wearing a hard hat, holding a flashlight and walking down stairs
To inspect existing plant protection features against seismic and flooding events, and correct any degraded conditions Request for Information
Emergency Preparedness – Staffing and Communications
a brown bell image with two curved lines on either side, signifying the bell is ringing
To assess staffing needs and communications capabilities to effectively respond to an event affecting multiple reactors at a site. Request for Information
Station Blackout Mitigation Strategies
a brown circle outline with a brown, rectangle on and off switch in the middle of the circle with the swith in the On position and the words On and Off
To enhance the capability to maintain plant safety during a prolonged loss of electrical power. Rulemaking
Onsite Emergency Response Capabilities
a drawn image of a brown loose-leaf binder page with two paragraphs of simulated written information each with a large check mark to the left of each paragraph.
To strengthen and integrate different types of emergency procedures and capabilities at plants. Rulemaking
Filtration and Confinement Strategies
a brown outline of a domed nuclear reactor building with a white square representing a reactor and a connected vent stack with a white dotted line arrow going up the vent stack
To evaluate potential strategies that may further confine or filter radioactive material if core damage occurs Rulemaking
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Tier 2 Activities

Activity Brief Description NRC Addressing by…
Spent Fuel Pool Makeup Capability To provide a reliable means of adding extra water to spent fuel pools Order [consolidated into Mitigation Strategies]
See COMSECY-13-0002 and its associated approval for details
Emergency Preparedness To address three aspects of Emergency Preparedness for multi-reactor and loss of power events:
  1. Training and exercises (drills)
  2. Equipment, facilities, and related resources
  3. Multi-unit dose assessment capability
Order [aspects (1) and (2) consolidated into Mitigation Strategies]
NRC-endorsed industry initiative [to address aspect (3)]
See COMSECY-13-0010 and its associated approval for details
"Other" External Hazard Reevaluations To reanalyze the potential effects of external hazards other than seismic and flooding events (which are being addressed under Tier 1). Request for Information [planned]
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Tier 3 Activities

Plans for addressing each of these activities are available in Enclosure 3 to SECY-12-0095
Activity Brief Description NRC Addressing by…
Periodic Confirmation of External Hazards To ensure external hazards, such as seismic and flooding effects, are periodically reanalyzed during the lifetime of a plant. Rulemaking [planned]
Seismically-Induced Fires and Floods To evaluate potential enhancements to the capability to prevent or mitigate seismically‑induced fires and floods. Longer-term evaluation
Venting Systems for Other Containment Designs To evaluate the need for enhancements to venting systems in containment designs other than Mark I and II (which are addressed under Tier 1). Longer-term evaluation
Hydrogen Control To evaluate the need for enhancements to hydrogen control and mitigation measures inside containment or other plant buildings. Longer-term evaluation
Emergency Preparedness To evaluate additional enhancements to Emergency Preparedness (EP) programs that go beyond the Tier 1 and Tier 2 EP-related activities. Longer-term evaluation
Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) Capability To enhance the capabilities of the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) Longer-term evaluation
Decision-making, Radiation Monitoring, and Public Education To evaluate the need for enhancements to Emergency Preparedness programs in the areas of decision-making, radiation monitoring, and education. Longer-term evaluation
Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) Updates To modify the Reactor Oversight Process to reflect any changes to the NRC's regulatory framework (which is being pursued under a separate activity). Dependent on Regulatory Framework activity
Training on Severe Accidents To enhance training of NRC staff on severe accidents and related procedures. Dependent on outcome of Onsite Emergency Response Capabilities (Tier 1)
Emergency Planning Zone To evaluate whether the basis for the size of the emergency planning zone needs to be modified. Longer-term evaluation
Potassium Iodide (KI) To evaluate the need to modify existing programs for the pre-staging of potassium iodide. Longer-term evaluation
Expedited Transfer of Spent Fuel to Dry Cask Storage To evaluate the merits of expediting the transfer of spent nuclear fuel from storage pools to dry cask storage. See this staff memo to the Commission and staff requirements memorandum for more details
Reactor and Containment Instrumentation To evaluate potential enhancements for instrumentation in the reactor and containment that can withstand severe accident conditions. Longer-term evaluation
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