A Realistic and Effective Policy on Sensitive Nuclear Activities
he U.S.
government will very soon set a new policy course on the
nonproliferation terms it wants to incorporate into new bilateral
peaceful nuclear cooperation agreements with foreign countries.
It is likely that the administration will instruct diplomats to persuade the foreign countries with which it intends to cooperate in the future to refrain from engaging in enrichment of uranium or the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel (ENR) on their territories if they do not already possess such capabilities. Enrichment and reprocessing are sensitive nuclear activities because they can produce nuclear materials directly usable in nuclear weapons.
Yet, the U.S. government should not require all foreign countries with which it concludes new nuclear cooperation agreements to legally commit themselves not to enrich uranium and reprocess spent fuel. Requiring countries to do this in all future U.S. peaceful nuclear cooperation agreements would seriously challenge the credibility of the United States to demonstrate global nonproliferation leadership.
http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/10/15/realistic-and-effective-policy-on-sensitive-nuclear-activities/gqeu
It is likely that the administration will instruct diplomats to persuade the foreign countries with which it intends to cooperate in the future to refrain from engaging in enrichment of uranium or the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel (ENR) on their territories if they do not already possess such capabilities. Enrichment and reprocessing are sensitive nuclear activities because they can produce nuclear materials directly usable in nuclear weapons.
Yet, the U.S. government should not require all foreign countries with which it concludes new nuclear cooperation agreements to legally commit themselves not to enrich uranium and reprocess spent fuel. Requiring countries to do this in all future U.S. peaceful nuclear cooperation agreements would seriously challenge the credibility of the United States to demonstrate global nonproliferation leadership.
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