A non-proliferation puzzle from Stephen M. Walt
Over at the NPT Review Conference, the United States is supporting the idea of a "nuclear weapons free zone" in the Middle East. This position actually goes all the way back to a resolution adopted at the 1995 review, but it's a goal that the United States has soft-pedaled in the past. Even now, U.S. officials have made it clear this goal depends on first achieving a comprehensive peace agreement between Israel and its neighbors.
Makes sense to me. As a practical matter, Israel isn't going to give up its existing nuclear arsenal until its security concerns are met. That would be my position too if I were an Israeli official, because a nuclear deterrent is the ultimate guarantee against military conquest or a WMD attack.
So here’s the puzzle: If Washington clearly understands that Israel won't give up its nuclear weapons until its broader security concerns are resolved (and maybe not even then), why does it simultaneously think that Iran can be convinced to suspend nuclear enrichment without its own security concerns being addressed? Like their predecessors in the Bush adminstration, the Obama administration is still demanding that Iran first abandon its nuclear program and is back to the familiar game of trying to ramp up sanctions in order to compel compliance. The United States says it is willing to talk about Iran’s own security concerns after Tehran plays ball with us, but with no guarantee that we will actually do anything about the issues that bother them.
In other words, in one case the United States recognizes that comprehensive peace and reliable security guarantees are a prerequisite for disarmament; in the other case, we think disarmament must come first and that security guarantees are secondary if not irrelevant. I don’t have any trouble understanding why U.S. policy differs in the two cases, but why supposedly serious people think our approach to Tehran will succeed is beyond me.
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I would appreciate your passing the following message to Professor Walt:
ReplyDeleteDear Professor Walt,
You are, of course, correct in drawing the parallel between Israel wanting the ultimate defense and Iran also wanting it. It is beyond me how our government either cannot understand or accept the parallelism. I have been pointing this out in my writings for a long time also (for example most recently in my book Understanding Iran).
But, it seems to me that there is a possible solution to the puzzle: In my talks with the Israelis, I have argued that even if having a nuclear deterrent was protective of Israel in the past, today it is becoming a source of danger. And the danger will grow. Whether or not we, they or anyone can convince Iran not to acquire actual weapons, we almost certainly cannot prevent it from acquiring the means to make the jump relatively rapidly from capability to possession.
Acquisition by Iran is seen by the Israelis as the immediate issue, but over the middle term probably and certainly over the longer term, the fact that israel has a huge arsenal will propel other Middle Eastern states to acquire at least the means to get them. Whether the UAE, for example, could build them, I cannot believe that it could not eventually buy them. North Korea and Pakistan would, under reasonably predictable circumstances, find it hard to turn down $5 for $10 billion. And Iraq, from its experience in not having weapons and its projected wealth from development of its oil, will almost certainly do all it can to get them. Can others be far behind? Thus, from living in a nuclear unipolar Middle East, Israel's own policy is pushing toward a nuclear multipolar Middle East. That is bound to be against Israel's interests.
I agree with you (and I guess although I can never tell exactly what the Administration has determined) that Israel's position on nuclear weapons is linked to the Palestine problem, but even short of solving that issue. which every year becomes more intractable, Israel could in its own interests take the lead in pushing for a nuclear free Middle East. After all, it has the strongest army and air force in the area and has the US in its wallet. And, if I am correct that the value of its nuclear deterrent is diminishing at best and more likely as I say turning into a liability, it would be a shrewd move for Israel to proclaim its intent to take the high ground. And it would cost Israel nothing in practical terms since it would have have to give up anything until the process was well along. The process would not, could not, be rapid and during the working out of the modalities even the Palestinian issue might become more amenable to a modus vivendi (although I do not think that a modus vivendi, much less a solution, is really Israel's intent)
I am fully aware of how difficult working toward a nuclear free zone out in practice would be, but anything else is likely to be far worse for everyone.
With kind regards,
Bill Polk
William R. Polk
williamrpolk@post.harvard.edu
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