Two Time Bombs in New START
By joshua | 26 September 2010 | 1 Comment According to the preamble of New START, the Treaty’s measures “will enhance predictability and stability, and thus the security of both Parties.” The preamble also deems the Treaty part of an effort “to forge a new strategic relationship based on mutual trust, openness, predictability, and cooperation.” But as I’ve described it in my latest column at the Bulletin, the spirit of the U.S. Senate’s resolution of ratification — whose complete and final text is now available at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee website — seems closer to the rigorous and mistrustful enforcement of numerical parity.
Consider this an early warning, not a complaint. The Senate’s gimlet eye is only to the advantage of ratification, since some senators are unlikely to vote “yes” unless convinced that America “won” the negotiation — and not necessarily in the sense of a “win-win” outcome. But the unsparing language of the resolution also underscores the Treaty’s deferral of a pair of neuralgic issues, either of which could unravel the entire fabric someday: missile defense and conventional prompt global strike (CPGS).
(Warning: long and wonky post.)
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Consider this an early warning, not a complaint. The Senate’s gimlet eye is only to the advantage of ratification, since some senators are unlikely to vote “yes” unless convinced that America “won” the negotiation — and not necessarily in the sense of a “win-win” outcome. But the unsparing language of the resolution also underscores the Treaty’s deferral of a pair of neuralgic issues, either of which could unravel the entire fabric someday: missile defense and conventional prompt global strike (CPGS).
(Warning: long and wonky post.)
Read Full Story →
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