Michele Kearney's Nuclear Wire

Major Energy and Environmental News and Commentary affecting the Nuclear Industry.
Showing posts with label Government Accountability Office. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Government Accountability Office. Show all posts

Thursday, December 16, 2010

Four-Year Nuclear Security Plan Needs More Detail, GAO Says

Four-Year Nuclear Security Plan Needs More Detail, GAO Says


The Obama administration should address in more specific terms how it plans to achieve its goal of securing all loose nuclear material in the world within four years, congressional investigators said in a report released yesterday (see GSN, April 14).
The National Security Council has signed off on a comprehensive approach for the material security plan "that describes the scope and objectives of the interagency effort and identifies the main efforts by U.S. agencies and programs to support the initiative," according to a summary of the Government Accountability Office report.
"However, this interagency strategy lacks specific details concerning how the initiative will be implemented, including the identity of vulnerable foreign nuclear material sites and facilities to be addressed, agencies and programs responsible for addressing each site, planned activities at each location, potential challenges and strategies for overcoming those obstacles, anticipated time lines, and cost estimates," according to the document. "As a result, key details associated with the initiative are unclear, including its overall estimated cost, time frame, and scope of planned work."
Congressional auditors found that two Energy Department nonproliferation programs -- the Materials Consolidation and Conversion program and the Global Threat Reduction Initiative -- have worked to lock down Russia's nuclear warheads and supplies less effectively than the department's Material Protection, Control and Accounting program (see GSN, Dec 13).
Moscow's uncertain dedication to joint U.S.-Russian nuclear threat reduction work has placed in question the future of the three programs, all of which are overseen by the Energy Department's semiautonomous National Nuclear Security Administration, the report asserts.
The MPC&A effort faced an uphill drive to augment measures for protecting a number of Russian atomic sites against internal and external security risks and turning responsibility for the new safeguards over to Moscow, the document states. The difficulties were likely to prevent compliance with a U.S. legal mandate that Russia fully take over the MPC&A program by the start of 2013, the report says. The auditors urged the Energy Department and National Nuclear Security Administration to develop a more precise breakdown of the initiative's uncompleted objectives and anticipated expenses in Russia.
In China and India, political concerns have restricted NNSA nuclear security activities to the exchange of security best practices, training and demonstration efforts, the report notes.
The Energy Department agency was moving forward in negotiations with South Africa, Ukraine and other nations to expedite the removal of potential nuclear bomb ingredients within their borders, the auditors found (U.S. Government Accountability Office release, Dec. 15).
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Thursday, September 16, 2010

Senators Knock DHS Nuclear Detection Office for Wasting Money, Time By Martin Matishak

U.S. Department of Homeland Security Official ...Image via Wikipedia
A truck pulls a shipping container through a portal radiation scanner at Port Everglades in Fort Lauderdale, Fla., in 2007. A U.S. Homeland Security Department office squandered years and hundreds of millions of dollars developing ineffective technology for spotting potential illicit nuclear material in U.S.-bound cargo, ranking lawmakers on a Senate committee said yesterday (Joe Raedle/Getty Images).
WASHINGTON -- The U.S. Homeland Security Department has wasted several years and nearly half a billion dollars attempting to develop and deploy the next generation of radiation detection monitors, leaders of an influential Senate panel said yesterday (see GSN, Sept. 13).
Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee Chairman Joseph Lieberman (I-Conn.) and ranking member Susan Collins (R-Maine) also chastised the department for failing to prepare a strategic plan to prevent the smuggling into the country of materials that could be used in a nuclear attack.
The plan, dubbed the global nuclear detection architecture, was first suggested by the Government Accountability Office in 2001. It is intended to close existing vulnerabilities and alert federal agencies to their roles in preventing terrorists from detonating a nuclear or radiological bomb within the United States.
See Full Article...
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Wednesday, September 15, 2010

Audit: South Carolina radioactive waste cleanup will cost $1.5 billion more than expected


The Department of Energy will have to spend nearly $1.5 billion more than planned to decommission the Savannah River Site in South Carolina, according to an audit by the Government Accountability Office. The department, which bid $3.2 billion for the project, miscalculated by about 70% on labor expenses and did not compute other costs, the report added. Star Tribune (Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minn.)/The Associated Press
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Tuesday, September 14, 2010

Nuclear Waste: Actions Needed to Address Persistent Concerns with Efforts to Close Underground Radioactive Waste Tanks at DOE's Savannah River Site

Nuclear Waste: Actions Needed to Address Persistent Concerns with Efforts to Close Underground Radioactive Waste Tanks at DOE's Savannah River Site

This government Accountability Report (GAO-10-816) dated September 14, 2010, finds that emptying, cleaning, and permanently closing the 22 underground liquid radioactive waste tanks at the Savannah River Site is likely to cost significantly more and take longer than estimated in the December 2008 contract between DOE and SRR. Originally estimated to cost $3.2 billion, SRR notified DOE in June 2010 that the total cost to close the 22 tanks had increased by more than $1.4 billion or 44 percent. Much of this increase is because DOE’s cost estimate in the September 2007 request for proposals that formed the basis of the December 2008 contract between DOE and SRR was not accurate or comprehensive. For example, DOE underestimated the costs of labor and fringe benefits. DOE also omitted certain other costs related to equipment and services needed to support tank closure activities.
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