Michele Kearney's Nuclear Wire

Major Energy and Environmental News and Commentary affecting the Nuclear Industry.
Showing posts with label Israel. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Israel. Show all posts

Tuesday, January 11, 2011

Iran scientist's 'killer trained in Israel': report




http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Iran_scientists_killer_trained_in_Israel_report_999.html Tehran (AFP) Jan 10, 2011 The alleged killer of a top nuclear scientist who was murdered last year said he was trained in Israel by the Mossad spy agency, state-television reported on its website on Monday. Majid Jamali Fash, identified in the report as "a member of Mossad terrorist network and the main element" behind last year's assassination of nuclear scientist Masoud Ali Mohammadi, said he was trained by Israeli military officers at a base near Tel Aviv.
"On a trip to Tel Aviv, I got acquainted with several senior Israeli officers in a base on a highway between Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. There, I learned different things such as tailing, stalking and planting bombs under vehicles," Fash was quoted as saying on the website.
He did not say when he had made the trip to Israel.
Fash said he was briefed about Ali Mohammadi and "practised bombing in a base near Tel Aviv several times."
"I was given a very precise model of Dr Ali Mohammadi's house and its whereabouts to be very well acquainted with the real situation of his assassination."
The report said that the details of his interview will be released on Tuesday.
Earlier on Monday, Iran said it had arrested "spies and terrorists" linked with Mossad who were behind Ali Mohammadi's killing.
The intelligence ministry said in a statement carried by state television that Iran's security forces had "infiltrated" Israeli intelligence and obtained "important and sensitive information on Mossad spies and operations."
"The main elements behind this terrorist crime (assassination) were arrested and a network of spies and terrorists linked to the Zionist regime was dismantled," it said.
In January 2010 Ali Mohammadi, a particle physics professor at prestigious Tehran University, was killed in a bomb attack outside his home which Iran blamed on "mercenaries" in the pay of Israel and the United States.
"Mossad... has had some European and non-European bases as well as bases in some neighbouring countries and used them to direct the unmanly assassination of Ali Mohammadi," the ministry said Monday.
It added that further information about "Mossad's infiltration as well as the dismantling of its espionage networks and the plotting of our prominent scientist's assassination will be gradually revealed in due time."
Iran has also blamed the intelligence services of Israel, the United States and Britain over bomb attacks against two top nuclear scientists on November 26.
Majid Shahriari, a senior scientist involved in Iran's nuclear activities, was killed by a bomb placed against his car, while Fereydoon Abbasi Davani, another top nuclear expert, was wounded in a similar attack.
Iran is under four sets of UN sanctions over its refusal to suspend uranium enrichment, the sensitive process which can be used to make nuclear fuel or, in highly extended form, the fissile core of an atom bomb.
Western governments suspect Iran's nuclear programme masks a drive for an atomic weapons capability, an ambition Tehran has steadfastly denied.
Israel and its ally the United States have not ruled out a military strike against Iran to stop its nuclear programme.
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Monday, December 27, 2010

Israel destroyed Syria nuclear reactor: WikiLeaks



  Jerusalem (AFP) Dec 24, 2010 Israel destroyed a Syrian nuclear reactor in an air raid just weeks before it went online in 2007, said a US diplomatic cable released by WikiLeaks and published on Friday in an Israeli daily. "On September 6, 2007, Israel destroyed the nuclear reactor built by Syria secretly, apparently with North Korea's help," then US secretary of state Condoleezza Rice wrote in the cable published in Yediot Aharonot newspaper.
"Our intelligence experts are convinced that the attack targeted by the Israelis is in fact an atomic reactor of the same type built by North Korea in Yongbyon," she wrote in the message dated April 2008.
"We have good reason to believe that the reactor was not built for peaceful purposes," she said, adding the attack came only weeks before the reactor was to become operational.
Rice also noted the secrecy surrounding the construction of the nuclear facility, with the Syrian authorities refusing to invite the International Atomic Energy Agency or any media to inspect the site.
Syria has always denied that the structure targeted by Israeli warplanes was a nuclear reactor, although it has admitted it was a "military site under construction."
Israel has for its part never denied that its air force attacked a target in Syria, without ever officially claiming responsibility for the action.
Former US president George W. Bush recounted in his memoirs that he resisted Israeli pressure to bomb the site.
In 2008, current US President Barack Obama said when he was a Democratic hopeful for the White House that Israel was right to bomb the suspected nuclear facility in Syria.
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Sunday, December 26, 2010

Iran Seeks Foreign Nuclear Scientists, Former Diplomat Asserts


A former Iranian envoy to Norway said his country has pursued scientists from North Korea and other nations to help support a nuclear-weapon program, the London Telegraph reported yesterday (see GSN, Dec. 22).
Defector Mohamed Reza Heydari recounted facilitating the entry of dozens of North Koreans into Iran as a Foreign Ministry operative based at Imam Khomeini International Airport in Tehran.
"Our mission was to coordinate with a team from the Ministry of Intelligence in checking the visas of the foreign diplomatic and trade delegates who visited Iran, with special attention to VIPs," Heydari said.
"We had the instructions to forgo any visa and passport inspections for Palestinians belonging to Hamas and North Korean military and engineering staff who visit Iran on regular basis.
"The North Koreans were all technicians and military experts involved in two aspects of Iran's nuclear program. One to enable Iran to achieve nuclear bomb capability, and the other to help increase the range of Iran's ballistic missiles," Heydari said.
"In all our embassies abroad, especially in the African countries, the staff of [Iran's] Foreign Ministry were always looking for local scientists and technicians who were experts in nuclear technology and offered them lucrative contracts to lure them into Iran.
"The facade of the nuclear program is that it is for peaceful purposes, but behind it they have a completely different agenda," he said. The United States and other world powers have sought for years to negotiate curbs on Iran's uranium enrichment program, which can generate civilian nuclear fuel as well as weapons material.
Signs have emerged that Iran is working on centrifuges based on a North Korean design at facilities not revealed to the International Atomic Energy Agency, one Western official told the Telegraph (see GSN, Sept. 25, 2009). The North Korean centrifuges were said to be more technically advanced and greater in size than Iran's standard machines.
"Iran finances North Korea's missile program in exchange for access to technologies; North Korea's Nodong missile series is the basis for Iran's flagship Shahab missile project," former U.S. Defense Department adviser Christina Lin said.
It is necessary to "reassess" the status of Iran's nuclear program while taking North Korea's alleged assistance into account, Washington Institute for Near East Policy analyst Simon Henderson added (Damien McElroy, London Telegraph, Dec. 22).
Meanwhile, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev yesterday called on Tehran to bolster its nuclear transparency, Bloomberg reported.
“Iran must allow IAEA officials on its territory and make it possible to bring the situation under control,” Medvedev said. “This is why there are issues with Iran and sanctions against it.”
Iran has stonewalled certain efforts by the agency to clarify its nuclear intentions. For example, Tehran has refused to elaborate on its contention that Western powers falsified documents, provided to the U.N. nuclear watchdog, that suggest the Middle Eastern state studied nuclear-weapon design in the past (Arkhipov/Meyer, Bloomberg, Dec. 22).
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Thursday, December 16, 2010

New theory: Stuxnet was actually created by … China?

Darned compelling, and darned depressing. Not only because it snatches away our vicarious pride in U.S./Israeli ingenuity, but it feeds into western jitters about Chinese omnicompetence. Why, I’ll bet it was those Shanghai teens who cooked this thing up. During recess.
The circumstantial evidence is impressive. Just one question: Why would China do it?
China has an intimate knowledge of Iran’s centrifuges since, according to one source quoted above, they’re of Chinese design.
China has better access than any other country to manufacturing plans for the Vacon frequency converter drive made by Vacon’s Suzhou facility and specifically targeted by the Stuxnet worm (along with an Iranian company’s drive). Furthermore, in March 2010, China’s Customs ministry started an audit at Vacon’s Suzhou facility and took two employees into custody thereby providing further access to Vacon’s manufacturing specifications under cover of an active investigation.
China has better access than any other country to RealTek’s digital certificates through it’s Realsil office in Suzhou and, secondarily, to JMicron’s office in Taiwan.
China has direct access to Windows source code, which would explain how a malware team could create 4 key zero day vulnerabilities for Windows when most hackers find it challenging to develop even one.
That’s four pieces of evidence. Read the whole story and you’ll see that there’s more; plus, and needless to say, when it comes to cyberwar hijinks in the past few years, the Chinese are usually a safe bet as the culprits. More at:
http://hotair.com/archives/2010/12/15/new-theory-stuxnet-was-actually-created-by-china/
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Sunday, December 12, 2010

Israel may have no military option against Iran


Israel may have no military option against Iran

Israeli leaders should understand that the attack option isn't really an option - a thousand new fire trucks and even the Iron Dome missile defense system will not provide protection.

http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/opinion/israel-may-have-no-military-option-against-iran-1.330130



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Debunking Myths of Iran's Fuel Deal - Bulletin of Atomic Scientists


Debunking Myths of Iran's Fuel Deal - Bulletin of Atomic Scientists
Dealing with Iran’s nuclear program is one of the most important foreign policy issues of the day. Years of stalled talks, diplomatic dead-ends, and sanctions have made it difficult to see exactly where progress has been made with Iran and what efforts are worth pursuing. In “The Iranian quagmire: How to move forward” (November/December 2010 Bulletin), leading foreign policy experts weigh in from around the world on how to proceed with Iran -- from clear diplomacy to fuel swaps to the darkest scenario of military strikes. Whatever their proposed solutions, the writers express one common theme: We ignore Iran at our own peril. From the US, Thomas R. Pickering, Lawrence J. Korb, and Bennett Ramberg; from Turkey, Mustafa Kibaroglu; from Iran, Kayhan Barzegar; and from Israel, Emily B. Landau.

Below, more experts explore the options, their strengths and weaknesses, and propose various structures and points to consider as the West and Iran are set to re-enter talks in November. 

 

 
http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/roundtables/iran-and-the-west-next-steps#rt8569
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Wednesday, November 17, 2010

Iran and the West: Next steps

Dealing with Iran’s nuclear program is one of the most important foreign policy issues of the day. Years of stalled talks, diplomatic dead-ends, and sanctions have made it difficult to see exactly where progress has been made with Iran and what efforts are worth pursuing. In “The Iranian quagmire: How to move forward” (November/December 2010 Bulletin), leading foreign policy experts weigh in from around the world on how to proceed with Iran -- from clear diplomacy to fuel swaps to the darkest scenario of military strikes. Whatever their proposed solutions, the writers express one common theme: We ignore Iran at our own peril. From the US, Thomas R. Pickering, Lawrence J. Korb, and Bennett Ramberg; from Turkey, Mustafa Kibaroglu; from Iran, Kayhan Barzegar; and from Israel, Emily B. Landau.

Below, more experts explore the options, their strengths and weaknesses, and propose various structures and points to consider as the West and Iran are set to re-enter talks in November.


http://thebulletin.org/web-edition/roundtables/iran-and-the-west-next-steps?utm_source=MailingList&utm_medium=email&utm_content=micheletkearney%40gmail.com&utm_campaign=Nuclear+news+Issue+%234-+FAS+Podcast+7
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Wednesday, November 3, 2010

Iran and the West: Next steps

Dealing with Iran’s nuclear program is one of the most important foreign policy issues of the day. Years of stalled talks, diplomatic dead-ends, and sanctions have made it difficult to see exactly where progress has been made with Iran and what efforts are worth pursuing. In “The Iranian quagmire: How to move forward” (November/December 2010 Bulletin), leading foreign policy experts weigh in from around the world on how to proceed with Iran -- from clear diplomacy to fuel swaps to the darkest scenario of military strikes. Whatever their proposed solutions, the writers express one common theme: We ignore Iran at our own peril. From the US, Thomas R. Pickering, Lawrence J. Korb, and Bennett Ramberg; from Turkey, Mustafa Kibaroglu; from Iran, Kayhan Barzegar; and from Israel, Emily B. Landau.
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Friday, October 29, 2010

Russia denies arms deals with Syria

Russia denies arms deals with Syriahttp://www.spacewar.com/reports/Russia_denies_arms_deals_with_Syria_999.html
Moscow (UPI) Oct 28, 2010 - Media reports claiming Russia will deliver MiG-31 fighter jets and supersonic anti-ship missiles to Syria are false, the head of the Russian arms export agency said. "The contract for deliveries of MiG-31s to Syria exists only in the tall tales of journalists," Anatoly Isaikin, the head of Russian state arms exporter Rosoboronexport, told Russian news agency RIA Novosti. "Rosoboronexpor ... more
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Monday, October 25, 2010

ISRAEL'S NUCLEAR AMBIGUITY RECONSIDERED

The Israeli policy of "nuclear opacity" -- by which that country's presumptive nuclear weapons program is not formally acknowledged -- is examined in the new book "The Worst-Kept Secret: Israel's Bargain with the Bomb" by Avner Cohen (Columbia University Press, October 2010).

For a variety of reasons, the author concludes that Israel's "nuclear opacity" is obsolete and will have to be replaced, sooner or later, with a forthright acknowledgment of what everyone already believes to be the case anyway.

Cohen, an Israeli scholar who was trained as a philosopher, provides a lucid account of how nuclear opacity has "worked," i.e. served Israeli interests, by providing the benefits of deterrence without the negative political and strategic consequences that could ensue from overt disclosure.  But its time has passed, he says.

"I argue that the old Israeli bargain with the bomb has outlived its usefulness, that it has become increasingly incompatible with contemporary democratic values at home and with the growth of international norms of transparency, and that it is time for Israel and others to consider a new bargain."  Among other things, he says, the continuing development of nuclear weapons-related technology in Iran is likely the force the issue to a new degree of clarity.

For the time being, however, there is no sign of any change in Israel's position on the matter.  "Israel has a clear and responsible nuclear policy, and it has frequently reiterated that it will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East," David Danieli of Israel's Atomic Energy Commission told Haaretz last month.  "Israel neither adds to nor subtracts from this statement."

Avner Cohen's "The Worst-Kept Secret" was reviewed recently in the New York Times and the Forward.
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Friday, October 22, 2010

Blix: Israeli Military Strike on Iran Might be Illegal By Martin Matishak Global Security Newswire


WASHINGTON -- Any possible military action by Israel against Iran's nuclear installations is likely to violate the international rule of law, according to former International Atomic Energy Agency chief Hans Blix (see GSN, Oct. 21).
Former International Atomic Energy Agency Director General Hans Blix, shown in July, on Wednesday warned that potential Israeli strikes on nuclear facilities in Iran could violate international law (Ben Stansall/Getty Images).
Since Tehran has not launched an armed campaign on another nation, nor does it appear to be preparing for one, "it doesn't seem to me that an attack on Iran can be legally defended," he said Wednesday during a panel discussion at the Georgetown University Law Center.
The U.N. charter states that member nations, including Israel, "shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent" with the goals of the international body.
Observers "can see many other reasons, very good reasons, why there should not be an attack on Iran," including the unintended consequences such an event might have throughout the region, but the legal argument has yet to be explored in depth, Blix told the audience.
He did not specify what kind of consequences, from a formal condemnation or something more serious, Israel might incur from the international organization if it moves against Iran. More at:

http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_20101022_4047.php
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Thursday, October 21, 2010

Islamic Nations Demand Israeli Atomic Transparency



The 57-nation Organization of the Islamic Conference yesterday called for U.N. inspections of Israel's nuclear arsenal, Iran's Press TV reported (see GSN, Sept. 24).
Israel is widely believed to possess the only nuclear arms in the Middle East, though it has for decades maintained a policy of neither confirming nor denying its arsenal.
"Israel's nuclear weapons should be inspected by the International Atomic Energy Agency," OIC Secretary General Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu said at a nuclear security and nonproliferation summit in Cairo, Egypt (see GSN, Oct. 19). The meeting was set to address nuclear counterterrorism, efforts to secure potential nuclear-weapon ingredients and efforts to establish a WMD-free zone in the Middle East.
All countries should encourage Jerusalem to abandon its atomic arsenal and join the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, Ihsanoglu said. He backed the right of all states to develop civilian nuclear power programs while arguing it was indefensible to permit only certain nations to possess nuclear weapons.
The U.N. nuclear watchdog is not an appropriate forum for lobbying Israel to join the nonproliferation pact, U.S. State Department spokesman P.J. Crowley said in September. Jerusalem has offered complete cooperation with the Vienna-based atomic agency, he said (Press TV, Oct. 20).

http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_20101021_4764.php

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Saturday, October 16, 2010

Israel signs $400 million deal with Russia


Israel signs $400 million deal with Russia


Tel Aviv, Israel (UPI) Oct 15, 2010 Israel Aerospace Industries has signed a $400 million contract to sell unmanned surveillance drones to Russia, a deal intended to boost relations between the two countries and, Israelis hope, encourage Moscow to curb arms sales to Iran and Syria. The deal was signed Tuesday by IAI Chief Executive Officer Itzhak Nissan and Andrey Reus, director-general of the Oboronprom Russian Industrial Corp.
The contract calls for IAI, Israel's largest industrial exporter and a leader in the design and production of unmanned aerial vehicles, to provide drone kits to Oboronprom for assembly in Russia.
Few details were disclosed but the deal follows a landmark, long-term military cooperation agreement signed in Moscow Sept. 6 by Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak and his Russian counterpart, Anatoly Serdyukov. More at:
http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Israel_signs_400_million_deal_with_Russia_999.html

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Tuesday, October 12, 2010

Iran to show proof of US nuclear aid to Israel: negotiator

Iran to show proof of US nuclear aid to Israel: negotiator

by Staff Writers Tehran (AFP) Oct 11, 2010 Iran's top nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili said on Monday that Tehran is to reveal proof of how nuclear material enriched by United States was delivered to the Islamic republic's arch-foe Israel. "We will soon publish documents on how American enriched nuclear material was provided and transported to the Zionist regime," Jalili said, quoted on state television's website.
Jalili said the key question in the Muslim world was "how the Zionist regime acquired these (nuclear) weapons?"
"The Zionist regime and those who gave these weapons to the regime should answer for this."
Israel, widely believed to be the sole but undeclared nuclear weapons power in the Middle East, has not ruled out a military strike against Iran's atomic facilities in a bid to stop Tehran's controversial nuclear programme.
Iran, which denies Israeli and Western suspicions it is making nuclear arms, has repeatedly called for Israel to be questioned over its reported atomic arsenal and to be pressured to join the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
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Wednesday, October 6, 2010

Illusions about Nuclear Weapons: 1, Britain; 2 ,Iran by William Pfaff

Illusions about Nuclear Weapons: 1, Britain; 2 ,Iran

William Pfaff - http://www.williampfaff.com/article.php?storyid=485

2010/10/6
Paris, October 5, 2010 – Of all of the sources of strategic delusion and political illusion today, nuclear weapons undoubtedly make the most prodigious contribution to hypocrisy, and useless expense. This certainly is true for Britain, which is set to take major decisions on military expenditure this week. It is expected to avoid a decision on its largest new military expenditure, by postponing replacement of its Trident nuclear deterrent until after the next general election.

This, if so, is very sensible. Trident’s sole value to Britain is symbolic, theoretically substantiating its rank as a nuclear member of the UN Security Council with a veto. The Trident missiles are leased to them. They are, as they have been for many years, integrated into the American nuclear deterrent system, the missiles and their programming under American Navy control. They have always been superfluous to an American nuclear attack on some rival, as they were during the Cold War. Their value to Britain is political.

In this respect they bear no comparison to the French nuclear deterrent, which is entirely of French manufacture and under complete French control. It could be used against anyone the French wished to attack -- even the United States, for example -- and being a submarine system it provides a deterrent second-strike capacity. It is not subject to destruction by an enemy first strike, but could retaliate afterwards – a dozen enemy cities -- although God only knows what would be left of either the enemy or France after this was over.

How Britain spends its military money is of urgent American interest for entirely non-nuclear reasons. High ground force numbers means reduced expenditure on the RAF and Royal Navy, in the current international climate of impoverishment and governmental austerity.

The Pentagon is putting on London all the considerable pressure it commands to keep the numbers up on British ground forces, since these remain the only foreign forces likely (more likely than any other, certainly) to go on being placed at American disposal in what the Obama administration seems to have endorsed as “the Long War” -- the “fight we’re in for the rest of our lives, and probably our kids’ lives,” according to a recent pronouncement by General David Petraeus, who currently is in charge of running this war for the Pentagon-cornered President Barack Obama. (To say “no” to the generals would destroy – or possibly, a subversive thought, make, the Obama presidency.) Washington is anxious that London continues to contribute troops (which is not totally assured, since the British public is questioning the purpose and prospects of this Long War).

Iran, on the other hand, is where a non-existent nuclear weapon dominates a region. American and Israeli officials, think-tank “experts,” and newspaper strategists tell us Iran must be stopped from acquiring the capacity for manufacturing a nuclear weapon. This allegedly would put Israel at the mercy of “the mullahs,” and the whole region under the latters’ domination.


The truth is that “the mullahs” are at the mercy of Israel, which possesses what is probably, outside present and recent “superpowers,” the most formidable nuclear arsenal in the world. What is a nuclear “superpower”? It is a state possessing a credible nuclear second-strike force.

Iran will never be a superpower by that criterion, but Israel has been one for a long time. Israel is concerned about an Iranian nuclear weapon because of the political and psychological effects upon both states’ standing in the Middle East. Possession of a nuclear weapon would not embolden Iran to attack Israel or anyone else, but it deeply would alter the regional political climate if Iran were a nuclear state, since this would give pause to anyone hostile to Iran.

The United States would suffer the greatest blow to its “non kinetic” power (as the Pentagon likes now to describe means of power that do not go “bang!”). It has invested so much of its non-kinetic power in declaring that Iran must not possess a nuclear weapon that it would suffer a major humiliation if that should occur, and probably suffer a great deal more than a humiliation since Iran also possesses a formidable non-nuclear deterrent against military attack by either the United States or Israel.

This is its retaliatory ability to do grave military damage to American forces in Iraq, naval forces in the Gulf, and U.S. bases in Kuwait, Qatar and elsewhere in the region. It could disrupt shipping in the Gulf, and block the Strait of Hormuz, interrupting a significant part of America’s and the West’s oil supply for a considerable period. This why the Pentagon has been so anxious to restrain Israel from attacking Iran. The United States and its Arab allies and clients would pay the principal cost if it did so. This possibility also constitutes implied Israeli blackmail of the United States: “Do what we want, or we will provoke Iran to make a devastating attack on U.S. interests throughout the region.”

The American interest would have been better served, following the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-1988, by turning a blind eye to Iran’s effort to acquire “peaceful nuclear energy,” and to Saddam Hussein’s quest to deter Iran. Taking them both on has meant double trouble for Washington, and in the end probably double failure. Plus, there’s Afghanistan.
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Monday, October 4, 2010

U.S. power plants at risk of attack by computer worm like Stuxnet

Computer Worm Stuxnet Copies Could Shut Down U.S. Power Plants

The Stuxnet computer worm, whose origin is still unknown, could serve as a blueprint for malware that would sabotage infrastructure critical to running U.S. power plants and electric grids, according to experts, the Washington Post reported. Michael J. Assante, former chief security officer at NERC, was quoted as saying: "A copycat may decide to emulate it, maybe to cause a pressure valve to open or close at the wrong time. You could cause damage, and the damage could be catastrophic." Joe Weiss, an industrial control system security specialist and managing partner at Applied Control Solutions, was quoted as saying: "What this is, is essentially a cyber weapon."
Symantec analyzed the worm and guessed that its target could have been Iran's nuclear enrichment facilities. Wrote the Post: "The United States has a covert program to sabotage the systems that undergird Iran's nuclear facilities. Some experts have also suggested that other countries, including Israel, could be behind Stuxnet." Joel F. Brenner, an ex-national counterintelligence executive and former senior counsel at the National Security Agency, said he thought the U.S. probably did not create the worm. He warned against assuming it was created by any nation state.
The worm exploited four Microsoft "zero-day" vulnerabilities and targeted a specific kind of Siemens software, according to the Post. NERC issued recommendations to power companies about how they could protect their facilities, but said companies were not required to follow them


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Tuesday, September 28, 2010

Cyberwarfare Works on Same Premises as Nuclear War By Russ Wellen


The computer worm Stuxnet didn't exactly bore into the computers of workers in Iran's nuclear program. In fact, whoever unleashed it -- Israel or another state --  sprayed it indiscriminately like machine gun fire. John Markoff of the New York Times reports:
The most striking aspect of the fast-spreading malicious computer program — which has turned up in industrial programs around the world and which Iran said had appeared in the computers of workers in its nuclear project — may not have been how sophisticated it was, but rather how sloppy its creators were in letting a specifically aimed attack scatter randomly around the globe.
Thus, perhaps because of a perceived time crunch on the part of the creators, it created what Markoff called "collateral damage" as if it were a military attack. Now for a riddle: name the weapon which never causes collateral damage? Nuclear weapons. Civilians, of course, form the better part of their intended targeted and are in no sense of the word collateral.
But cyberwarfare resembles nuclear weapons in other ways. Markoff also writes that cyberwarfare is . . .
. . . also raising fear of dangerous proliferation. . . . "Proliferation is a real problem, and no country is prepared to deal with it," said Melissa Hathaway, a former United States national cybersecurity coordinator. The widespread availability of the attack techniques revealed by the software has set off alarms among industrial control specialists, she said: "All of these guys are scared to death. We have about 90 days to fix this before some hacker begins using it."
Of course, with nuclear weapons, proliferation occurs at a glacial pace compared with malware. In other words, the dangers of proliferation, purely as a concept, are much greater with a worm. To a certain extent, the immediacy of the threat of worms and viruses makes up for the immensity of the threat from nuclear weapons.
At War in Context, Paul Woodward called Stuxnet the Trinity test of Cyberwarfare. Which brings us to the most important similarity between nuclear war and cyberwarfare: love it or leave it -- deterrence. Woodward rhetorically asks what the implications of Stuxnet are.
1. Iran has been served notice that not only its nuclear facilities but its whole industrial infrastructure is vulnerable to attack. As Trevor Butterworth noted: "By demonstrating how Iran could so very easily experience a Chernobyl-like catastrophe, or the entire destruction of its conventional energy grid, the first round of the 'war' may have already been won."
2. The perception that it has both developed capabilities and shown its willingness to engage in cyberwarfare, will serve Israel as a strategic asset even if it never admits to having launched Stuxnet.
That's why Woodward compares the Stuxnet attack to Trinity, the first U.S. nuclear test. A demonstration of the weapon's power, it was intended to act as a deterrent to keep other states, such as Iran, from . . . what exactly? It might only motivate Iran to complete the nuclear-weapon development process. After all, it wouldn't want to be two weapon systems -- nuclear and cyber -- down on Israel, would it?
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Saturday, September 25, 2010

Iranian nuclear plants likely target of foiled cyber sabotage Speculation grows that Israeli hackers were behind operation – but analysts say it may be impossible to identify perpetrators

Who Is Trying To Hack Into Iran's Nuclear Plants?

Image: from Red Orbit

Iranian Nuclear Plants Likely Target Of Foiled Cyber Sabotage -- The Guardian

Speculation grows that Israeli hackers were behind operation – but analysts say it may be impossible to identify perpetrators

Iran was the likely target of a sophisticated computer worm designed to sabotage factories and infrastructure which was almost certainly the work of a national government agency, security experts told the Guardian yesterday.

According to the security company Symantec, 60% of the computers infected by the Stuxnet computer worm are in Iran, which is where the malicious software, known as malware, was discovered by a Belarussian computer security company.

Read more
....http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/sep/25/iran-cyber-hacking-nuclear-plants

More News On The Stuxnet Computer Worm

Iran's nuclear agency trying to stop computer worm -- AP
Cyber attack 'targeted Iran' -- Al Jazeera
'Stuxnet' Attack May Have Been Aimed At Iran: Experts -- Red Orbit
Stuxnet worm mystery: What's the cyber weapon after? -- Christian Science Monitor
Analysis: Iran "attack" points to rising cyber warfare risk -- Reuters
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Friday, September 24, 2010

: Israel's Nuclear Weapons By Warner D. Farr, LTC, U.S. Army



This paper is a history of the Israeli nuclear weapons program drawn from a review of unclassified sources.  Israel began its search for nuclear weapons at the inception of the state in 1948.  As payment for Israeli participation in the Suez Crisis of 1956, France provided nuclear expertise and constructed a reactor complex for Israel at Dimona capable of large-scale plutonium production and reprocessing. Continue


http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article26442.htm
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"In the Interests of Israel" Why Russia will not sell the S-300 Air Defense System to Iran By Gen. Vladimir Ivashov

-Russian army chief of staff Gen. N. Makarov broke the news on September 22 that Russia will not sell the S-300 air defense systems to Iran. Regardless of official explanations, it does not take an expert to realize that as a purely defensive system designed to shield a country from aircraft and cruise missile attacks the S-300 complexes cannot pose a threat to any country unless it attacks the one owning them. As for the standoff between Iran and Israel, Tehran is constantly confronted with threats of massive air strikes, and taking steps to prevent the aggression is a must for any country seeking to sustain peace, especially for a permanent UN Security Council member sharing the responsibility for global security. Aggression is least likely in the situation of military parity or if the potential victim is able to inflict unacceptable damage on the aggressor. Iran's possession of  the S-300 complexes could expose Israel's air forces to the risk of unacceptable damage in case the letter choses to attack the former. Denying Iran the right to efficient means of self-defense is tantamount to encouraging aggression against it. Isn't Russia thus helping to unleash a disastrous war in the proximity of its own borders, a war against a country which, by the way, hosts a large colony of Russian specialists? On top of that, the refusal to supply the S-300 complexes to Iran clearly hurts Russia's political and economic interests.
What could be the motivation behind Russia's recent decision? Obviously, it stems from several regards. Ostensibly unaware of the existence of Israel' nuclear arsenal, Moscow has for years been playing the game of taming Iran's alleged nuclear ambitions and voted for sanctions against the country in the UN Security Council. Actually, Tehran proposed a number of times to turn the Middle East into a nuclear-free zone. The plan was welcomed by the majority of the Arab world but seems to be a taboo for Russia's foreign ministry. Now, why is that? 

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