Michele Kearney's Nuclear Wire

Major Energy and Environmental News and Commentary affecting the Nuclear Industry.
Showing posts with label Iran. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Iran. Show all posts

Tuesday, January 11, 2011

Iran scientist's 'killer trained in Israel': report




http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Iran_scientists_killer_trained_in_Israel_report_999.html Tehran (AFP) Jan 10, 2011 The alleged killer of a top nuclear scientist who was murdered last year said he was trained in Israel by the Mossad spy agency, state-television reported on its website on Monday. Majid Jamali Fash, identified in the report as "a member of Mossad terrorist network and the main element" behind last year's assassination of nuclear scientist Masoud Ali Mohammadi, said he was trained by Israeli military officers at a base near Tel Aviv.
"On a trip to Tel Aviv, I got acquainted with several senior Israeli officers in a base on a highway between Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. There, I learned different things such as tailing, stalking and planting bombs under vehicles," Fash was quoted as saying on the website.
He did not say when he had made the trip to Israel.
Fash said he was briefed about Ali Mohammadi and "practised bombing in a base near Tel Aviv several times."
"I was given a very precise model of Dr Ali Mohammadi's house and its whereabouts to be very well acquainted with the real situation of his assassination."
The report said that the details of his interview will be released on Tuesday.
Earlier on Monday, Iran said it had arrested "spies and terrorists" linked with Mossad who were behind Ali Mohammadi's killing.
The intelligence ministry said in a statement carried by state television that Iran's security forces had "infiltrated" Israeli intelligence and obtained "important and sensitive information on Mossad spies and operations."
"The main elements behind this terrorist crime (assassination) were arrested and a network of spies and terrorists linked to the Zionist regime was dismantled," it said.
In January 2010 Ali Mohammadi, a particle physics professor at prestigious Tehran University, was killed in a bomb attack outside his home which Iran blamed on "mercenaries" in the pay of Israel and the United States.
"Mossad... has had some European and non-European bases as well as bases in some neighbouring countries and used them to direct the unmanly assassination of Ali Mohammadi," the ministry said Monday.
It added that further information about "Mossad's infiltration as well as the dismantling of its espionage networks and the plotting of our prominent scientist's assassination will be gradually revealed in due time."
Iran has also blamed the intelligence services of Israel, the United States and Britain over bomb attacks against two top nuclear scientists on November 26.
Majid Shahriari, a senior scientist involved in Iran's nuclear activities, was killed by a bomb placed against his car, while Fereydoon Abbasi Davani, another top nuclear expert, was wounded in a similar attack.
Iran is under four sets of UN sanctions over its refusal to suspend uranium enrichment, the sensitive process which can be used to make nuclear fuel or, in highly extended form, the fissile core of an atom bomb.
Western governments suspect Iran's nuclear programme masks a drive for an atomic weapons capability, an ambition Tehran has steadfastly denied.
Israel and its ally the United States have not ruled out a military strike against Iran to stop its nuclear programme.
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Friday, January 7, 2011

Redefining Denuclearization in Korea - Bulletin of Atomic Scientists

Article Highlights

  • The extent and sophistication of North Korea's centrifuge program demonstrates how poorly export controls limit a determined proliferator. Its current cooperation with the likes of Iran and Burma raise the specter of Pyongyang operating an A.Q. Khan-style import-export proliferation network.
  • Pyongyang would greatly increase the current nuclear threat if it expands HEU production at undisclosed sites, increases the size of its nuclear arsenal substantially, or conducts more tests to enhance its sophistication.
  • Not only must the international community work to limit Pyongyang's nuclear buildup, but the United States must conduct a thorough review of its policies on Northeast Asia security.
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Wednesday, January 5, 2011

Iran invites foreign diplomats to tour its nuclear sites (Update 1)



Iran's Bushehr nuclear power. © RIA Novosti.Andrey Reznichenko
Iran invites foreign diplomats to tour its nuclear sites (Update 1)
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Tuesday, January 4, 2011

U.S. Dismisses Iran Nuclear Overture from the Council on Foreign Relations

Tuesday, January 4, 2011



 
foreign diplomats from China, Russia, and several European Union countries to tour some of their nuclear facilities, including installations at Natanz and Bushehr. However, the United States was excluded from the group of invitees. The U.S. State Department, which has been leading the charge for economic sanctions against the regime, dismissed the gesture (WSJ)
 
as a "ploy" designed to divide the international community. U.S. and European diplomats have expressed fear that Iran may try to use diplomacy to forestall more economic sanctions while it continues to push forward with uranium enrichment. A spokesman for Tehran reiterated the strictly "peaceful" nature of the nuclear program (Reuters)
 
and claimed the latest invitation was a signal of "goodwill" and a willingness to cooperate with the international community. In addition, Iran expressed its desire to host the official visit prior to the next round of talks in Istanbul this month, but European officials said the invitation was not likely to be honored (NYT)
 
, if at all, until after the negotiations are completed.
Analysis:
This Foreign Affairs article discusses the dangers of a nuclear Iran
 
and the limits of containment policy.
Abbas Milani of ForeignPolicy.com details the rich history behind Iran's current nuclear ambitions and why the United States' denuclearization
 
drive isn't working.
Background:
View an interactive timeline that explores the history of U.S.-Iran relations
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Sunday, January 2, 2011

Iran's Nuclear Domino Effect by Andrew Roberts

A former Bush defense official says that Saudi Arabia and Pakistan might initiate a dangerous alliance if Iran develops nuclear weapons. Andrew Roberts speaks to Eric Edelman about the unintended consequences for South Asia. 


Might the impending nuclearization of Iran rapidly lead to a situation in which India targets nuclear weapons on Saudi Arabia? That is one of the many unnerving repercussions envisaged in an authoritative article, “The Dangers of a Nuclear Iran,” in the current issue of Foreign Affairs, written by, among others, Eric Edelman, President George W. Bush’s undersecretary of defense for policy from 2005 to 2009. When an analyst of Edelman’s seniority and ability, who moreover was working in the Pentagon with full access to all the available intelligence on precisely this issue as recently as two years ago, pronounces on questions of this gravity it behooves us to pay serious attention.
More at:

http://www.thedailybeast.com/blogs-and-stories/2011-01-02/irans-nuclear-weapons-could-lead-to-a-saudi-and-pakistan-alliance
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Thursday, December 30, 2010

The Dangers of a Nuclear Iran Eric S. Edelman, Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr, and Evan Braden Montgomery


The Dangers of a Nuclear Iran

Eric S. Edelman, Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr, and Evan Braden Montgomery
Iran's acquisition of a nuclear bomb would upend the Middle East. It is unclear how a nuclear-armed Iran would weigh the costs, benefits, and risks of brinkmanship, meaning that it could be difficult to deter Tehran from attacking the United States' interests or partners in the region. Read
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Monday, December 27, 2010

Istanbul talks can resolve nuclear row: Iran



http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Istanbul_talks_can_resolve_nuclear_row_Iran_999.html Damascus (AFP) Dec 27, 2010 A senior Iranian official said in Damascus on Monday that next month's talks in Istanbul between world powers and Tehran could resolve their dispute over Iran's nuclear programme. "We think (the negotiations), in line with the agenda decided in Geneva, could clear the way to resolving problems," said Ali Baqiri, the deputy of Said Jalili, Iran's nuclear negotiator.
"Continuing the negotiations in Istanbul could bring gains to both the parties concerned," Baqiri told a news conference after talks with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.
But he criticised the West's two-pronged policy of negotiations at the same time as sanctions, warning it would "lead nowhere."
Despite four sets of UN sanctions slapped on Tehran over its controversial nuclear programme, Iran was "carrying out the most extensive economic programme in its history, showing its level of political, economic and social stability."
Negotiations "based on dialogue and cooperation could bring the other parties out of their impasse," said Baqiri.
Assad, quoted by the state news agency SANA, called in his talks with Baqiri for "a diplomatic compromise guaranteeing Iran's right to possess peaceful nuclear energy."
Last week on a visit to Istanbul for a regional summit, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad urged the world powers to choose cooperation over confrontation at the nuclear talks in late January.
"We think this meeting will be very important," he said.
The negotiations would be the second round between Iran and six world powers -- Britain, China, France, Russia, United States and Germany -- after talks resumed in Geneva earlier this month following a 14-month hiatus.
"We have suggested that in the forthcoming Istanbul meeting confrontation be replaced with cooperation and... this will be in the interest of all sides," he said through an interpreter.
"In cooperation we will have a win-win situation. There is no failure or defeat for any party.
The West suspects that Tehran is developing am atomic bomb under the guise of a nuclear energy programme. Iran denies the charges and insists its activities have a purely peaceful purpose.
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Iran to launch 'reconnaissance' satellite



  http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Iran_to_launch_reconnaissance_satellite_999.htmlTehran (AFP) Dec 25, 2010 Iran will launch a reconnaissance satellite dubbed the "Fajr" in the next few months, Defence Minister Ahmad Vahidi said in a report Saturday by the official IRNA news agency. Vahidi said the Islamic republic would also put into space around the same time another satellite, the Rasad 1 (Observation), whose launch was originally scheduled for August 2010.
Iran is "building different satellites and by end of the (Iranian) year (March 2011), the Fajr and Rasad satellites will be launched into space," the minister was quoted as saying.
The news agency reported that Fajr (Dawn) was a "reconnaissance satellite" that would operate on solar energy.
"These satellites are different from the previous models. They have better fuel systems and can stay in space for a longer time," Vahidi said.
Vahidi said he expected Rasad 1 to be delivered to the communication ministry and launched during the 32nd anniversary of the 1979 Islamic revolution which falls on February 11, 2011.
In February 2009, Iran launched its first home-built satellite, the Omid (Hope).
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Sunday, December 26, 2010

Iran Seeks Foreign Nuclear Scientists, Former Diplomat Asserts


A former Iranian envoy to Norway said his country has pursued scientists from North Korea and other nations to help support a nuclear-weapon program, the London Telegraph reported yesterday (see GSN, Dec. 22).
Defector Mohamed Reza Heydari recounted facilitating the entry of dozens of North Koreans into Iran as a Foreign Ministry operative based at Imam Khomeini International Airport in Tehran.
"Our mission was to coordinate with a team from the Ministry of Intelligence in checking the visas of the foreign diplomatic and trade delegates who visited Iran, with special attention to VIPs," Heydari said.
"We had the instructions to forgo any visa and passport inspections for Palestinians belonging to Hamas and North Korean military and engineering staff who visit Iran on regular basis.
"The North Koreans were all technicians and military experts involved in two aspects of Iran's nuclear program. One to enable Iran to achieve nuclear bomb capability, and the other to help increase the range of Iran's ballistic missiles," Heydari said.
"In all our embassies abroad, especially in the African countries, the staff of [Iran's] Foreign Ministry were always looking for local scientists and technicians who were experts in nuclear technology and offered them lucrative contracts to lure them into Iran.
"The facade of the nuclear program is that it is for peaceful purposes, but behind it they have a completely different agenda," he said. The United States and other world powers have sought for years to negotiate curbs on Iran's uranium enrichment program, which can generate civilian nuclear fuel as well as weapons material.
Signs have emerged that Iran is working on centrifuges based on a North Korean design at facilities not revealed to the International Atomic Energy Agency, one Western official told the Telegraph (see GSN, Sept. 25, 2009). The North Korean centrifuges were said to be more technically advanced and greater in size than Iran's standard machines.
"Iran finances North Korea's missile program in exchange for access to technologies; North Korea's Nodong missile series is the basis for Iran's flagship Shahab missile project," former U.S. Defense Department adviser Christina Lin said.
It is necessary to "reassess" the status of Iran's nuclear program while taking North Korea's alleged assistance into account, Washington Institute for Near East Policy analyst Simon Henderson added (Damien McElroy, London Telegraph, Dec. 22).
Meanwhile, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev yesterday called on Tehran to bolster its nuclear transparency, Bloomberg reported.
“Iran must allow IAEA officials on its territory and make it possible to bring the situation under control,” Medvedev said. “This is why there are issues with Iran and sanctions against it.”
Iran has stonewalled certain efforts by the agency to clarify its nuclear intentions. For example, Tehran has refused to elaborate on its contention that Western powers falsified documents, provided to the U.N. nuclear watchdog, that suggest the Middle Eastern state studied nuclear-weapon design in the past (Arkhipov/Meyer, Bloomberg, Dec. 22).
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Thursday, December 16, 2010

New theory: Stuxnet was actually created by … China?

Darned compelling, and darned depressing. Not only because it snatches away our vicarious pride in U.S./Israeli ingenuity, but it feeds into western jitters about Chinese omnicompetence. Why, I’ll bet it was those Shanghai teens who cooked this thing up. During recess.
The circumstantial evidence is impressive. Just one question: Why would China do it?
China has an intimate knowledge of Iran’s centrifuges since, according to one source quoted above, they’re of Chinese design.
China has better access than any other country to manufacturing plans for the Vacon frequency converter drive made by Vacon’s Suzhou facility and specifically targeted by the Stuxnet worm (along with an Iranian company’s drive). Furthermore, in March 2010, China’s Customs ministry started an audit at Vacon’s Suzhou facility and took two employees into custody thereby providing further access to Vacon’s manufacturing specifications under cover of an active investigation.
China has better access than any other country to RealTek’s digital certificates through it’s Realsil office in Suzhou and, secondarily, to JMicron’s office in Taiwan.
China has direct access to Windows source code, which would explain how a malware team could create 4 key zero day vulnerabilities for Windows when most hackers find it challenging to develop even one.
That’s four pieces of evidence. Read the whole story and you’ll see that there’s more; plus, and needless to say, when it comes to cyberwar hijinks in the past few years, the Chinese are usually a safe bet as the culprits. More at:
http://hotair.com/archives/2010/12/15/new-theory-stuxnet-was-actually-created-by-china/
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University of Tokyo and IAEA Join Forces to Improve Nuclear Science Education

University of Tokyo and IAEA Join Forces to Improve Nuclear Science Education

The IAEA and the University of Tokyo in Japan signed an agreement in Vienna, formalising their decision to work together to enhance nuclear engineering and management research, education and training.
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Sunday, December 12, 2010

Israel may have no military option against Iran


Israel may have no military option against Iran

Israeli leaders should understand that the attack option isn't really an option - a thousand new fire trucks and even the Iron Dome missile defense system will not provide protection.

http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/opinion/israel-may-have-no-military-option-against-iran-1.330130



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Debunking Myths of Iran's Fuel Deal - Bulletin of Atomic Scientists


Debunking Myths of Iran's Fuel Deal - Bulletin of Atomic Scientists
Dealing with Iran’s nuclear program is one of the most important foreign policy issues of the day. Years of stalled talks, diplomatic dead-ends, and sanctions have made it difficult to see exactly where progress has been made with Iran and what efforts are worth pursuing. In “The Iranian quagmire: How to move forward” (November/December 2010 Bulletin), leading foreign policy experts weigh in from around the world on how to proceed with Iran -- from clear diplomacy to fuel swaps to the darkest scenario of military strikes. Whatever their proposed solutions, the writers express one common theme: We ignore Iran at our own peril. From the US, Thomas R. Pickering, Lawrence J. Korb, and Bennett Ramberg; from Turkey, Mustafa Kibaroglu; from Iran, Kayhan Barzegar; and from Israel, Emily B. Landau.

Below, more experts explore the options, their strengths and weaknesses, and propose various structures and points to consider as the West and Iran are set to re-enter talks in November. 

 

 
http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/roundtables/iran-and-the-west-next-steps#rt8569
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How Will Iran Respond to NATO's Missile Shield? By Michael Eisenstadt

How Will Iran Respond to NATO's Missile Shield?

By Michael Eisenstadt
The new "Strategic Concept" that NATO is expected to adopt at its Lisbon summit this weekend offers the advantage of an early initial capability to defend Europe against the emerging Iranian ballistic missile threat, even though -- in deference to Turkish sensibilities -- NATO is not expected to identify Iran as the source of the threat. For now, the Islamic Republic is unable to reach targets in Eastern Europe, but that could change as early as 2012 if Tehran decides to commence production of the medium-range Sajjil-2 missile. And because the NATO concept hinges first on the deployment of ship-based missile systems to the eastern Mediterranean, followed later by the deployment of land-based interceptors, it entails certain vulnerabilities that Iran could exploit in the near term.
http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2010/11/21/how_will_iran_respond_to_natos_missile_shield_99286.html
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Friday, December 10, 2010

Global Insights: One Step Forward, One Back for Nuclear Nonproliferation By: Richard Weitz | Column


http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/7244/global-insights-one-step-forward-one-back-for-nuclear-nonproliferation
Two developments this week illustrated the "one step forward, one step back" nature of global nuclear nonproliferation efforts. On the one hand, Iran announced further progress in its domestic nuclear program, increasing Tehran's potential ability to make nuclear weapons. On the other, the IAEA voted to establish the first completely multinational nuclear fuel bank.
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Thursday, December 9, 2010

Wikileaks on the state of Venezuel's nuclear capabilities


Unfortunately most of this stuff was too funny to publish on WNN and I kept our item short and straight, but WikiLeaks has a couple of good cables on the state of Venezeula’s nuclear capabilities.


Definitely worth a read – this is amazing and amusing stuff!

Cheers,

Jeremy.


Jeremy Gordon
Editor, World Nuclear News
Writer & Analyst, World Nuclear Association

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Wednesday, December 8, 2010

Prioritizing Nuclear Nonproliferation By: Justin Alger | ISN Security Watch

Prioritizing Nuclear Nonproliferation

A sign warning from radiation, courtesy of Ed Siasoco/flickr
Creative Commons - Attribution 2.0 Generic Creative Commons - Attribution 2.0 Generic
A warning sign at the Trinity site where the first nuclear explosion took place
With concerns about potential nuclear threats from Iran, North Korea and aspiring nuclear terrorists, nuclear weapons seem to have as much prominence on the security agenda as they did during the Cold War. Giving them such notoriety may, however, be doing more harm than good.More at:
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/ISN-Insights/Detail?lng=en&ots627=fce62fe0-528d-4884-9cdf-283c282cf0b2&id=124751&contextid734=124751&contextid735=124750&tabid=124750

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Russia, US ink agreement on reactor conversion By Jim Heintz

MOSCOW—Russia and the U.S. signed an agreement Tuesday on conducting feasibility studies for converting Russian research nuclear reactors to using low-enriched uranium.
Sergei Kiriyenko, the head of Russia's nuclear agency Rosatom, and U.S. deputy energy secretary Daniel Poneman signed the document.
Some research reactors in the United States already have been converted, part of a nonproliferation initiative to reduce the presence of uranium enriched to a sufficiently high concentration to be used in nuclear weapons.
A text of the agreement was not immediately available after the signing ceremony.
"As a general principle, we believe the right thing to do is to take highly enriched uranium where available and convert research reactors using that to low-enriched uranium, as a global matter that is a safer and more proliferation-resistant way to go," Poneman told reporters.
"It's fitting and proper that both Russia and the United States should be full participants in that process," he said.
Poneman said U.S.-Russian cooperation on such issues demonstrates the increasingly globalized nature of nuclear energy.
A Rosatom subsidiary last month bought 51 percent of the shares in Uranium One, a Canadian company whose holdings include uranium mines in the United States.
Responding to media commentary that the deal indicated the U.S. was losing control of strategic components, Poneman said: "I would say it reflects a misunderstanding of the fundamental nature of the international nuclear fuel cycle. Over a number of decades a very elaborate and complex multilayered fuel cycle has developed around the world."
http://www.boston.com/business/articles/2010/12/07/russia_us_ink_agreement_on_reactor_conversion/
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Monday, December 6, 2010

Iran's key nuclear sites

ran's key nuclear sites

Map of nuclear facilities in Iran

Arak - Heavy water plant

Aerial view of a heavy-water production plant Iran is building a reactor at Arak, where it already has a heavy-water production plant
The existence of a heavy water facility near the town of Arak first emerged with the publication of satellite images by the US-based Institute for Science and International Security in December 2002.
Heavy water is used to moderate the nuclear fission chain reaction either in a certain type of reactor - albeit not the type that Iran is currently building - or produce plutonium for use in a nuclear bomb.
In August 2010, the IAEA visited the IR-40 heavy water reactor site at Arak. It said the facility was still being built but some major equipment had been installed. Iran told the IAEA the operation of the reactor was planned to start in 2013.
The IAEA said that based on satellite imagery, the heavy water production plant appeared to be in operation, but had not had access to it to confirm such reports.

Bushehr - Nuclear power station

Reactor building at the Bushehr nuclear power plant The reactor building at Bushehr was built with Russian help
Iran's nuclear programme began in 1974 with plans to build a nuclear power station at Bushehr with German assistance.
The project was abandoned because of the Islamic revolution five years later, but revived in the 1990s when Tehran signed an agreement with Russia to resume work at the site.
Moscow delayed completion on the project while the UN Security Council debated and then passed resolutions aimed at stopping uranium enrichment in Iran.
In December 2007, Moscow started delivering the canisters of enriched uranium the plant needs.
Earlier in the same month, a US intelligence report said Iran was not currently running a military nuclear programme.
There are two pressurised water reactors at the site.
Satellite images from March 2010 show the first completed reactor building on a site that occupies 2.5 square kilometres (one square mile), about 17 km (11 miles) south of the city of Bushehr. Recent developments include a narrow channel to carry cooling water for the reactor from the Gulf.

Gachin - Uranium mine

Yellowcake Yellowcake is used in the preparation of fuel for nuclear reactors
In December 2010, Iran said it had delivered its first domestically produced uranium ore concentrate, or yellowcake, to a plant that can make it ready for enrichment.
Iran's nuclear chief Ali Akbar Salehi said the first batch of yellowcake had been sent from Gachin mine sent to the Isfahan conversion facility.
Mining operations started at the mine in 2004.
Iran was believed to be running low on its stock of yellowcake, originally imported from South Africa in the 1970s.

Isfahan- Uranium conversion plant

Men work inside of an uranium conversion facility March 30, 2005 Men making hexafluoride gas at the Isfahan uranium conversion facility
Iran is building a plant at a nuclear research facility to convert yellowcake into three forms:
  • Hexafluoride gas - used in gas centrifuges
  • Uranium oxide - used to fuel reactors, albeit not the type Iran is constructing
  • Metal - often used in the cores of nuclear bombs. The IAEA is concerned about the metal's use, as Iran's reactors do not require it as fuel.

Natanz - Uranium enrichment plant

Natanz uranium enrichment plant Iran is planning new facilities at Natanz
Iran resumed uranium enrichment work at Natanz in July 2004, after a halt during negotiations with leading European powers over its programme.
It announced in September 2007 that it had installed 3,000 centrifuges, the machines that do the enrichment. In 2010, Iran told the IAEA Natanz would be the venue for new enrichment facilities - construction of which would start around March 2011.
This is the facility at the heart of Iran's dispute with the United Nations Security Council.
The Council is concerned because the technology used for producing fuel for nuclear power can be used to enrich the uranium to a much higher level to produce a nuclear explosion.

Qom - Uranium enrichment plant

Iranian suspected facility in Qom IAEA says work started on Qom site earlier than Iran suggests
Iran revealed the existence of the Fordo enrichment facility, which is being built about 30km (20 miles) north of Qom, in September 2009.
The facility is believed to be on a mountain on a former Iranian Revolutionary Guards missile site to the north-east of Qom on the Qom-Aliabad highway, Western diplomatic sources say.
Iran said it began the project in 2007 - but the IAEA believes design work started there in 2006.
The IAEA said it expected the Qom site to start enriching uranium in 2011. It is believed to have facility for 3,000 centrifuges for the enrichment of uranium.
Iran wrote to the International Atomic Energy Agency saying it intended to build a plant to enrich uranium to 5% - not enough for a weapon.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-11927720
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French enrichment plant to close in 2012 from World Nuclear News by Warwick Pipe

The Eurodif gaseous diffusion uranium enrichment plant will operate until the end of 2012 under a newly concluded agreement between Areva and Electricite de France (EdF) that sets the operating conditions for a gradual transition from production at the old plant to the new Georges Besse II centrifuge enrichment plant. The long-awaited agreement, reached under a joint strategic framework between the two companies, will see the 10.8 million SWU Eurodif plant start operating at its minimum technical capacity as soon as possible. The agreement will see EdF supply the plant's electricity for the next two years and also enables EdF to supply an additional 1000 MW of electricity to its customers over that period and guarantees a further 2000 MW beyond that date. The first stage of the first unit of Georges Besse II began operating at the end of 2009 and the second is due to start production in 2011, although the two units are not scheduled to reach full capacity until 2015 and 2016 respectively. Both groups expressed their delight that "a solution has been found to ensure the smooth transition between Eurodif and the Georges Besse II enrichment plant."
http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/IT-French_enrichment_plant_to_close_in_2012-0612107.html
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